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There has been much attention paid to the macroeconomic implications of increased 
automation in the workforce, yet the psychological impact to affected workers has been 
largely ignored. To address this research gap, the purpose of this study was to examine the 
relationship between automation, operationalized as a set of generalizable experiential 
features, and the experience of agency at work, operationalized as momentary feelings of 
control within performance episodes. The study also examined trait-level predictors of 
experiential features of automation and proximal well-being outcomes in relation to 
experiences of agency. The study sample consisted of 81 full-time workers who used a 
variety of automated business software (e.g., Salesforce, PeopleSoft, QuickBooks) in their 
daily work tasks.  In line with expectations, I found that experiential features of automation, 
including perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, perceived reliability, and 
experience/skill, were positively related to experiences of agency, although I did not find 
support for the expected negative relationship between perceived level of automation and 
agency. However, there was a significant interaction effect between perceived level of 
automation and task difficulty on agency, such that the relationship between perceived 
level of automation and agency was positive under high task difficulty and negative under 
low task difficulty. Although the hypotheses for the trait-level predictors of the experiential 
features of automation were largely unsupported, I found positive relationships between 
the experience of agency and feelings of authenticity and work engagement. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that there are shared experiential features of automated 




momentary experiences of control (i.e., agency) are related to meaningful well-being 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The prospect of technology taking over human work has become increasingly 
salient given the accelerated technological advancements in the 21st century. Technology 
has always been an integral part of work, but the study of how technology is changing the 
nature of work has not received much research attention in organizational literature. 
Research that has been done on technology in Industrial-Organizational (I-O) psychology 
and Organizational Behavior (OB) literature has largely focused on topics like mobile-
based assessment and selection (Brenner, Ortner, & Fay, 2016; Chapman & Webster, 2003; 
Stone, Deadrick, Lukaszewski, & Johnson, 2015), remote teamwork (Maruping & 
Agarwal, 2004; Townsend, DeMarie, & Hendrickson, 1998), gamification of learning and 
assessment (Landers, 2014, 2015) and the role of social media in the workplace (Landers 
& Schmidt, 2016; McFarland & Ployhart, 2015). However, research on the impact of 
technology on people’s everyday work experience has been lacking. Rather than examining 
technology as an additional feature amongst traditional I-O and OB topics, the present 
investigation seeks to explicate the psychological role of automation in the experience of 
work.  
The growing role of technology in the labor market largely reflects the increased 
presence of automation. Automation is broadly defined as technology’s performance of 
functions that once were (or feasibly could be) performed by humans (R. Parasuraman, 
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000), and it is becoming more pervasive across both white- and 
blue-collar jobs. McKinsey Global Institute estimates that about half of the global work 




suggests that many of the common tasks that employees now perform could be easily 
outsourced to technology in the coming years. There is also widespread unease among 
workers that their jobs are at risk due to ‘technological unemployment’. A public opinion 
study conducted by the Pew Research Center (Wike & Stokes, 2018) revealed that 65% of 
U.S. respondents believed it was likely in the next 50 years that robots and computers 
would do much of the work currently done by humans, echoing the fear that people will 
lose their jobs to technology and that those jobs will not be replaced. 
However, Manyika et al. (2017) propose that it is more likely, at least in the near 
term, that workers will incorporate automation into their work roles and operate alongside 
technology, rather than being completely displaced. Automation is currently best suited for 
repetitive, data-based tasks, rather than tasks that are novel or that require creative or social 
intelligence (Frey & Osborne, 2013). Given the complexity and social nature of many 
workers’ job responsibilities, it is unlikely that many jobs would able to be completely 
automated into a set of routine tasks. For example, there are many tasks in healthcare that 
can be automated, such as patient check-ins and medical record management, but the strong 
socioemotional component of caregiving in healthcare has a very low risk of being 
automated any time soon. Moreover, automation exists on many levels that differ by the 
degree to which the automation assists a human operator, which implies that automation is 
not an ‘all-or-nothing’ phenomenon in the workplace (R. Parasuraman et al., 2000). So, 
rather than technology completely taking over jobs or humans continuing to use technology 
merely for assistance on tasks, it appears that the structure of most work roles will become 




There are important implications of the increased presence of automation in the 
workplace for the psychology of work. A salient example of a dramatic technological shift 
in work is the creation of the driverless car. One of the most populated jobs among men in 
the United States is truck driving (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017), which is an occupation 
that could be eliminated entirely by driverless cars within the next few decades. However, 
while driverless car technology is still in its adoption phase, it is likely that truck drivers 
will remain employed as ‘monitors’ to ensure safe travels and deliveries. The shift in 
responsibilities from driving to automation monitoring undoubtedly has effects on truck 
drivers’ daily experiences of their jobs and their overall attitudes towards their work, 
although there is no I-O research currently being conducted on this topic in anticipation of 
these kinds of organizational changes.  
In the present investigation, I aimed to explore the experience of working with 
automation to highlight the psychological impact of automation on the worker. Most 
discussions about technology and work occur outside of I-O psychology and they focus on 
the impact of technological disruption on the broader labor market. I instead sought to 
understand how automated technologies are influencing workers’ experiences in their 
existing jobs. To do so, I examined individuals’ experiences working with automation, 
operationalized as automated business software in the proposed investigation. The primary 
momentary experiential outcome of interest was agency, which was defined as the 
momentary feeling of control that arises from a perceived match between one’s intentions 
and outcomes (Bayne & Levy, 2006). The primary goal of the proposed investigation was 
to define and explore the shared experiential mechanisms by which various automated 




precursors and exploratory moderators of these relationships were examined to understand 
the potential facilitating conditions under which automated technologies may be 
experienced as agency-enhancing or diminishing. Proximal well-being outcomes, 
including positive affect, authenticity, and work engagement, were examined to determine 
if there were positive or negative experiential consequences related to working with certain 





CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The primary momentary experiential outcome of interest in this study was agency, 
defined as the momentary feeling of control that arises from the perceived match between 
one’s intentions and outcomes. Agency was of foremost interest in this study because the 
greater incorporation of automation into the workforce has implications for a kind of 
‘shared agency’ among humans and technology. Agency is also a central component of the 
activity of working. Weiss (2014) defines the activity of work as an agentic, creative 
activity often involving the creation of artifact. Fundamental to this person-centric 
definition of work is the notion of individuals as agentic doers, such that they originate 
plans for action at work and carry out those actions in relevant work tasks. The experience 
of work cannot be understood without understanding how and when individuals experience 
agency within their work activities. Thus, the examination of the impact of automation on 
agency represents a fundamental starting point to understanding how the use of automation 
impacts the experience of work. In this section, I further describe how agency is 
conceptualized in this study and why agency is an important extension to the extant control 
literature in the organizational sciences, particularly to understand the effects of automation 
on work experiences.  
 Agency 
The term ‘agency’ has a variety of meanings across different kinds of literature. 
One way in which different agency terms can be understood is through the scope of action 
and/or time that they are positioned to address. For example, one sociological definition of 




(Kristiansen, 2014, p. 15). Bandura (2006) describes agency in the same manner, 
suggesting that to be a human agent is to “influence intentionally one’s functioning and life 
circumstances” (p. 164). These, and other similar definitions of agency (Alkire, 2005; Cote 
& Levine, 2002; Little, Snyder, & Wehmeyer, 2006; Martin, Sugarman, Thompson, 
Thompson, & Thompson, 2003) all broadly describe agency as the human ability to be 
self-directive. Alternatively, in areas such as philosophy and cognitive psychology, the 
sense of agency has been defined as the experience of control over one’s actions and the 
outcomes of those actions, in relation to specific sensorimotor acts (Haggard, 2017; 
Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). Thus, the extent of human behavior that the term ‘agency’ has 
been used to describe has ranged from experiences of discrete actions to one’s entire 
lifespan.  
Agency has also been used to describe the way that individuals structure their life 
narratives. McAdams, Hoffman, and Day (1996) propose a dichotomy between agency and 
communion themes in people’s stories about their lives. Agency, in this context, refers to 
descriptions of the self in terms of self-protection, self-expansion, and mastery of the 
environment. In contrast, communion themes are used to describe the individual as a 
member of a larger community, involving terms such as union, love, and intimacy 
(McAdams et al., 1996). Thus, ‘agency’ represents the description of oneself as an 
independent actor. This definition differs from those mentioned above as it refers to an 
explanatory style about life experiences, rather than referring to the experiences 
themselves. However, given the abundance of work incorporating this perspective on 
agency in personality (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Wiggins, 1991), gender (Carlson, 1971; 




organizational (van Marrewijk, 2003) psychology research, it is important to acknowledge 
this line of work before turning to the proposed definition.  
 Definition and Mechanism of Agency 
For the purposes of this study, agency has been defined as the feeling of control 
that arises from the perceived match between one’s intentions and outcomes. This 
definition of agency draws most closely from the sense of agency literature. The sense of 
agency, as it has traditionally been examined, refers to “the experience of being in control 
both of one’s own actions and, through them, of events in the external world” (Haggard & 
Tsakiris, 2009, p. 242). Cognitive psychologists have mainly focused on when and how 
the sense of agency arises in relation to individuals’ neural activity and sensorimotor 
actions (Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2017; Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Ebert & Wegner, 2010; 
Engbert, Wohlschlager, & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2005; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 
2009; Sato & Yasuda, 2005), whereas philosophers have theorized about the 
phenomenology of the sense of agency within normal and abnormal circumstances (i.e., in 
disorders of volition; Bayne, 2008; Bayne & Levy, 2006; Buhrmann & Di Paolo, 2017; 
Gallagher, 2000, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Hohwy, 2007; Pacherie, 2007, 2012). 
Given the current interest in examining the sense of agency in relation to the experience of 
work, there are a few key differences between the sense of agency as it has been 
traditionally examined and the current definition, which I will review here. 
First, in my interest, ‘intentions and outcomes’ as applied to the current definition 
of agency refer to higher order work activities, rather than discrete actions. Rather than 




agency within work activities allows for a dynamic understanding of individuals’ 
experiences of control that are associated with meaningful work-related goals. For 
example, a person could feel a strong sense of agency within a particularly effective writing 
session or a diminished feeling of agency after a frustrating meeting. In both examples, the 
examination of agency is tied to the extent to which a person’s intentions are realized for a 
particular performance episode. Those intentions could be writing a certain number of 
words or successfully communicating a point to coworkers. Performance episodes are 
defined as “naturally segmented, relatively short episodes thematically organized around 
work-relevant immediate goals or desired end states” (Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 
2005, p. 1055), and they provide a meaningful structure with which to understand 
experiences of agency at work. Performance episodes are not a necessary component of 
the definition of agency, although they provide insight into the ways in which agency may 
ebb and flow during the workday.  
Second, the perceived match between one’s intentions and outcomes within a work 
activity can be understood as the mechanism of agency, which gives rise to feelings of 
control, among other experiences. This notion is supported by extant cognitive psychology 
research that has explored the relationship between neural activity and the conscious 
experience of agency over action. There is great debate about how and when the sense of 
agency arises, which has led to two major perspectives: predictive and reductionist 
arguments (For a review, see Moore, 2016). The predictive, or comparative, argument 
suggests that agency stems from the match between internal predictions and sensory 
feedback of actions and action outcomes (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000; David, 




individuals are conscious of their intentions to act and of the acts themselves, but that they 
have no predictive control over those actions (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Rather, the 
reductionist argument claims that the sense of agency is merely illusory and serves as an 
explanatory mechanism for the results of actions that are controlled by unconscious 
pathways in the brain (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). In the reductionist 
argument, the sense of agency arises from a post-hoc realization of a match between one’s 
intentions and outcomes, rather than from a prediction.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively review the merits 
of these two arguments, both approaches converge on the notion that the sense of agency 
arises from the relationship between intention and action and between action and the effects 
of action. That is, regardless of how or when the sense of agency arises, either through 
intentional control over the motor system or through a top-down explanatory process, both 
views support the idea that agency arises from the perceived match between intentions and 
outcomes. Drawing on this shared belief, more recent theoretical work has sought to 
describe the sense of agency as the product of multiple sources of sensorimotor information 
(See Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009), with the basic notion that the sense of agency 
within normal subjects is the result of an experienced match between their intentions and 
outcomes. Although the discussion of the sense of agency at the sensorimotor level has 
limited applicability to an investigation of actions within work-relevant experiences, the 
broader notion of intention-outcome match can be generalized to examine individuals’ 
experiences of agency in their work. That is, agency can arise from a match between 
individuals’ intentions and outcomes of their work within specific performance episodes. 




of agency in those situations, depending upon the extent to which things are going ‘as 
planned’. Afterward, I can reflect upon on the extent to which my experiences conformed 
to my predictions for those situations. In the next section, I will detail the differences 
between these two states, the feeling of agency and the judgment of agency, as well as the 
associated experiential phenomena. 
 The Feeling, Judgment, and Experience of Agency 
The sense of agency has typically been conceptualized along two dimensions: the 
feeling of agency (FoA) and the judgment of agency (JoA). The FoA represents the low-
level, pre-reflective notion of being in control of one’s actions, whereas the JoA is the 
reflective judgment of control over one’s actions, which presumably involves some level 
of cognition. The FoA has been described as having a ‘thin phenomenology’ (Hohwy, 
2007), which references the fact that the FoA is short-lived and not a salient component of 
most actions. When individuals are involved in a given activity, they are not usually 
thinking about how much agency they have over their actions in the moment. Yet, they can 
reflect on their actions afterward and ascribe a JoA for themselves. A JoA is the conscious, 
cognitive awareness of “I did that”, and it accompanies most individuals’ experiences of 
their actions, except in cases of disorders of volition (e.g., schizophrenia; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, 2005). The FoA is typically assessed in an experimental 
setting by measuring individuals’ tendencies towards intentional binding, which is an effect 
of volitional action wherein individuals report a shortened time duration judgment between 
their agentic actions and the effects of those actions. Intentional binding has been a robust 
finding in relation to agentic actions across several studies (Moore & Obhi, 2012) and it is 




Knoblich, 2014). Judgments of agency are typically assessed by asking participants to rate 
their confidence about how much their actions have caused a given effect or event on some 
Likert-type scale (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014).  
Research that has examined both FoA and JoA has involved experiments that 
manipulate participants’ perceptual awareness of their actions to some extent, which allows 
for an examination of the facilitating conditions for the sense of agency. For example, in 
the demonstrative “I Spy” study, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) altered the experience of 
directing a mouse cursor over primed objects in a computerized I-Spy task, so that 
participants had to report how confident they were that their own direction versus a 
partner’s direction had caused the mouse cursor to move over the appropriate object. When 
the timing of primed information was manipulated such that individuals heard a certain 
word (e.g., “cat”) only 1-5 seconds before the cursor landed on that image, participants 
were just as likely to report a sense of agency (i.e., “I intended to make the stop”) when the 
confederate controlled the stop versus when the participant controlled the stop. This finding 
has been replicated in a similar experimental paradigm with primed information (Aarts, 
Custers, & Wegner, 2005), suggesting that individuals’ feelings of agency can be induced 
through manipulation of feedback about intentions and actions, despite an actual lack of 
control.  
Examinations of FoA and JoA are useful ways to understand the precise conditions 
under which the sense of agency may be altered, although they do not make sense for an 
initial attempt to understand the phenomenon of agency in the workplace. The population 
of interest in the proposed investigation is healthy, working adults, who are often not going 




which they caused a given effect with their actions. However, there are a variety of 
cognitive-affective states that are attached to the experience of one’s actions that are also 
related to the sense of agency. In addition to the feeling and judgment of agency, the 
experience of agency may be examined and provide information as to individuals’ agentic 
states. Several scholars describe the rich phenomenology of agency, including Pacherie 
who highlighted the following potential features:  
“awareness of a goal, awareness of an intention to act, awareness of initiation of 
action, awareness of movements, sense of activity, sense of mental effort, sense of physical 
effort, sense of control, experience of authorship, experience of intentionality, experience 
of purposiveness, experience of freedom, and experience of mental causation.” (Pacherie, 
2008, p. 180) 
These are some examples of the many ways that agency has been described, and 
there is a robust literature that explores these different aspects of agency experiences 
(Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Bayne & Levy, 2006; Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Buhrmann & Di 
Paolo, 2017; Gallagher, 2012; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Hohwy, 2007). There are various 
ways in which the experience of agency may be examined, depending on nature of the 
research question, and the proposed investigation narrows to a focus on the experience of 
momentary control within the sense of agency for several reasons.  
The experience of control, currently defined as the feeling of exerting influence 
over one’s environment, is arguably the most central component of agency. The terms 
‘control’ and ‘agency’ are used interchangeably across the sense of agency literature, which 




& Tsakiris, 2009; Limerick, Coyle, & Moore, 2014; Moore et al., 2009). Haggard and 
Tsakiris (2009) describe agency as the “experience of control through action” (p. 243), 
which suggests that agency is the feeling of control. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the experience of agency is predominantly that of control, although other feelings, such as 
effort and intentionality, are commonly mentioned in the sense of agency literature as well. 
However, other components of the agentic experience, such as effort, are often discussed 
contextually – such that high agency could be associated with high effort in one condition, 
and low effort in another (See Bayne & Levy, 2006 and Pacherie, 2008). The feeling of 
control, on the other hand, has an unequivocally positive relationship with agency – higher 
judgments of agency are related to higher feelings of control. Therefore, to streamline the 
proposed investigation as an initial step in this research space, I narrow my focus to the 
experience of control. I use the terms ‘feeling’ or ‘experience of control’ and ‘experience 
of agency’ interchangeably in this paper.  
 Agency in Work 
The study of agency, as currently defined, represents a novel contribution to 
organizational research. Although control has remained an important topic in the I-O and 
OB literatures, the examination of momentary control within agency augments the extant 
control research in two important ways. First, the construct of agency extends past research 
on trait-like control constructs, such as locus of control and self-efficacy, to a momentary 
level. It is well-known that ‘control’, broadly conceptualized, is an important predictor of 
well-being and performance at work. An internal locus of control, for example, is related 
to improvements in physical health, mental well-being, job performance, job motivation, 




Elfering, & Jacobshagen, 2008; Ng, Sorensen, & Eby, 2006; Wang, Bowling, & 
Eschleman, 2010). However, past research has largely examined ‘control’ as a stable 
feature of one’s self or one’s environment rather than as a dynamic, context-driven 
experience. Agency represents a momentary, first-person conceptualization of control that 
is context-independent, and this difference from past control constructs has important 
theoretical and practical implications. 
In terms of theoretical conceptualization, it is important to align the scope of a given 
construct with the measurement of said construct. ESM research gathers momentary 
instances of individuals cognitive-affective states, and as such the measurement of those 
states should occur at the state-, rather than trait-level. Far too often, ESM research is 
plagued by the arbitrary adaption of stable constructs to momentary measures by changing 
the wording of the scale items. The current study is no exception due to the absence of 
more appropriate measures (e.g., momentary work engagement), although this practice 
should improve given the abundance of ESM in organizational research. If what we really 
want to know is how much control a person feels in a given moment at work, rather than 
how much flexibility a job is currently offering (which is likely relatively stable over time, 
anyway), it makes more sense to examine agency, rather than momentary job autonomy. 
Although this issue is more of a comment about the current state of organizational ESM 
research rather than agency itself, it is nonetheless an important advantage of incorporating 





In practice, the transition from a trait-level to a momentary-level conceptualization 
of control also allows for a more fine-grained examination of how the experience of control 
ebbs and flows in concert with different contexts and events that arise across time at work. 
Given the fast-paced demands of the modern workforce, it is increasingly important to 
understand the drivers and obstacles to workers’ well-being and performance in their jobs. 
A better understanding of workers’ momentary experiences of control is one way to address 
this need.  Such research may also provide insight into how stable attributions of control at 
work, such as job autonomy or work locus of control, are formed and how they might 
change over time. In this way, experiences of agency represent the ‘process’ by which the 
‘outcomes’ of stable attributions of control may be formed. For example, a person who 
accumulates multiple experiences of high agency in their work may report a strong internal 
work locus of control, whereas a person who continually feels low agency in their jobs 
would likely endorse an external work locus of control. Future research might approach 
the study of agency in the workplace as a ‘lever’ for worker well-being, such that 
interventions that increase experiences of agency could lead to improvements in worker 
happiness and performance. For these reasons, the current examination of agency 
represents an important step towards understanding the first-person experience of control 
at work in a more precise, temporally-sensitive manner.  
The examination of agency also emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
individual worker. The first-person, person-centric perspective has been largely lacking in 
extant I-O research, in favor of approaches that operationalize constructs from the 
perspective of the organization. For example, job autonomy, a work-specific control 




work roles, including the extent to which they can determine the schedule of their work 
and the procedures to complete their work (Thompson & Prottas, 2006). This conceptual 
approach offers information about the amount of autonomy offered in the job itself, yet it 
ignores the extent to which a person actually feels a sense of control in day-to-day 
experiences in the job. Although it is certainly important to understand the conditions that 
facilitate or inhibit autonomy at work, it is equally important to know how those conditions 
contribute or detract from the actual experience of control, particularly if those conditions 
are fluid. 
I have made the case that the nature of work is changing due to technology, which 
I believe also increases the need for research that focuses on the individual worker rather 
than the organization (Weiss & Rupp, 2011). The first-person, person-centric approach is 
valuable not only because it is underutilized, but because it provides a useful way to 
understand the important role of work in people’s lives. Research on job loss and 
unemployment makes clear that work is an important contributor to individuals’ sense of 
well-being and life-purpose. Paul and Moser (2009) conducted a meta-analysis on the 
relationship between unemployment and several mental health indicators, including 
depression, anxiety, psychosomatic symptoms, and subjective well-being. Their results 
suggested that unemployment was not only correlated with poor mental health outcomes 
but also caused it, such that individuals experienced more distress following job loss, 
whereas distress was attenuated upon reemployment. To extend these findings, future 
research must explore the relationship between individuals and work as defined as an 
activity, rather than work as defined as a job. I argue that this understanding can be derived 




subjective account of working as its primary consideration. Agency is an inherent 
component of the activity of working and represents an important starting point for this 
broader research agenda. I now turn to discuss automation, which is an important driver of 
the change in the experience of work. 
 Automation 
The increasing presence of automation in the workplace leads to at least two 
changes to the nature of work: some work roles will be replaced by automation, while 
others will be adapted to incorporate automation. The incorporation of automation changes 
the kinds of tasks performed by a human worker, as well as the kinds of experiences formed 
while working. For example, the experience of working as a cashier becomes qualitatively 
different if self-checkouts are introduced across a cashier’s workplace. Without self-
checkouts, the cashier is responsible for ringing up items, interacting with customers, and 
completing sales. With self-checkouts, cashiers simply need to monitor the execution of 
these processes between the customer and the automated checkout, stepping in to resolve 
discrepancies when necessary. In this example, some of the cashier’s tasks are 
fundamentally different, whereas other tasks that were once carried out independently 
become shared with the automation. This shared action is the mechanism by which 
automation is expected to influence individuals’ experiences of agency at work. 
Specifically, I propose that automated technologies directly influence the intention-
outcome match process underlying the judgment of agency, which in turn influences 
feelings of control.  In the next section, I introduce the concept of technologically mediated 
intentionality as a guiding theoretical framework to explain how and why the use of 




 Technologically Mediated Intentionality 
The postphenomenological notion of ‘technologically mediated intentionality’, 
which stems from the philosophy of technology literature, proposes that individuals’ 
experiences of their worlds are shaped by technology (Verbeek, 2005). 
Postphenomenology is an approach in philosophy of technology that assumes that the 
relationship between technology and humans can only be understood from the lived-
through experience of humans interacting with technologies. Technologically mediated 
intentionality builds upon Idhe’s (1990) concept of ‘technological intentionality’, which 
suggests that technologies have a ‘certain directionality, an inclination or trajectory that 
shapes the ways in which they are used” (Verbeek, 2005). This concept implies that 
technologies have a way of altering human behavior through their use. Verbeek offers an 
example originally provided by Idhe in referencing the differences in writing styles 
produced by a fountain pen, typewriter, and word processor. Although each of these writing 
technologies is neutral in themselves, they each exert a distinct influence on an individual’s 
work activity. An individual using a fountain pen may write slowly and deliberately, 
whereas the same individual might quickly jot down any idea that comes to mind on a 
laptop. These two technologies, the fountain pen and the laptop, each have an 
‘intentionality’ that promotes a certain kind of use, like writing slowly or quickly.  
Intentionality takes on a further meaning in the term ‘technologically mediated 
intentionality’. In addition to the notion of ‘intentionality’ referring to the ways in which 
technology shapes human behavior, intentionality also refers to the fact that the relationship 
between humans and the world is mediated by technologies, which alters individuals’ 




technologies is accompanied by a different experience on behalf of the writer. Writing with 
a pen and paper may be more or less enjoyable, more or less effortful, or more or less 
engaging than typing on a computer. Thus, any experiential phenomenon is necessarily 
altered when technology is introduced, including experiences of agency. Given that 
automation alters experiences, and that the experience of agency accompanies all normal 
experiences of one’s actions, it follows that agency experiences are influenced to some 
extent when one uses an automated technology. 
It is not the case, however, that all technologies affect agency in the same manner. 
Although it is tempting to outline a set of objective characteristics of automation that could 
indicate whether the automation would be experienced as agency-enhancing or agency-
diminishing, technologies cannot be understood in isolation. As noted by Verbeek (2005), 
“Artifacts (technologies) can only be understood in terms of the relation that human beings 
have to them…The insight that technologies cannot be separated from their use contexts 
implies that they have no ‘essence’; they are what they are only in their use” (p.117). In 
other words, technologies do not have objective properties that implicate how they might 
be experienced in the absence of people using them. The experience of a technology can 
only become apparent through its use, which may differ across person, time, place, and 
purpose. Thus, the same technology could be experienced in completely different ways by 
different people. Therefore, instead of attempting to identify the ways in which material 
components of automated technologies impact the experience of work in the proposed 
study, I instead seek to outline universal experiential features of automated technologies 
that become apparent through their use and that are proposed to affect individuals’ 




automation and offer hypotheses regarding their impact on agency to be tested within an 





CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF AUTOMATION ON AGENCY 
The experiential features of automation that I will explore in the proposed 
investigation include the following: perceived level of automation, perceived ease of use, 
perceived usefulness, and the perceived reliability of the automation, as well as the 
experience/skill of the human operator. These features have been chosen because they 
represent salient components of the experience of working with automated technologies. 
Many of these features have been explored in other literatures, including management, 
information systems, and human factors, although not for the purpose of examining the 
impact of technology on the user’s experience. Instead, like technology-related I-O 
psychology research, other literatures’ research aims have been to improve humans’ usage 
of technology and to optimize associated performance outcomes. Thus, the proposed 
investigation involving these experiential features represents a novel attempt to explore 
how these features might impact workers’ daily experiences and well-being. 
Thus far, I have asserted that the perceived match between one’s intentions and 
outcomes is the mechanism through which the experience of agency (i.e., control) arises. I 
suggest that the use of automation impacts this mechanism of agency within activities that 
are accompanied by automation, thereby influencing the experience of agency. 
Specifically, I suggest that the use of automated technologies may either enhance or disrupt 
the intention-outcome match process because of the shared action involved in using an 
automated technology at work. When actions become shared in any capacity, with a joint 
computer actor or another person, an individual’s experience of agency is necessarily 




Wohlschläger, Haggard, Gesierich, & Prinz, 2003). I will describe here a study by Obhi 
and Hall (2011b) to illustrate how agency may be altered under conditions of shared action 
with technology to provide a foundation for the hypotheses that follow about the 
relationship between the experiential features of automation and agency. 
Obhi and Hall (2011b) conducted an experiment to examine the emergence of 
agency within shared action, both implicitly through intentional binding and explicitly 
through judgments of agency. In the experiment, 11 participants completed a computerized 
task with either a human co-actor or with a computer co-actor. In some trials of the 
experiment, participants tapped a touch pad and heard an auditory sound 200 milliseconds 
(ms) after their actions (although they were made to believe that the interval between their 
action and sound was random). They were asked to judge both the onset time of their 
actions and the time of the tone. These timing judgments were used to calculate the extent 
of their intentional binding. Afterwards, they were given on-screen feedback that informed 
them as to whether they had caused the tone, or if it had been caused by the other person 
(a confederate) or the computer agent. Participants were also asked to record their own 
private beliefs as to who caused the tone (self, other person, or computer) as a 
manipulation-check, which upon inspection were all in alignment with the feedback that 
participants had been given.  
Obhi and Hall (2011b) found that when participants thought they were operating 
alongside another human, they displayed intentional binding effects, indicated by a 
significantly shortened time interval reported between the onset time of the action and the 
time of the tone. The intentional binding effect occurred even when individuals reported 




intentional binding did not occur during the trials in which participants believed they were 
operating alongside a computer. The manipulation check that asked participants to report 
whom they believed had caused the tone served as the explicit judgment of agency, which 
was always in alignment with the information they had received on-screen. Thus, 
participants’ explicit judgments of agency always matched the high-level feedback they 
were given and were not always in alignment with the implicit measure of agency (i.e., 
intentional binding). The authors suggested that this finding indicates that the pre-reflective 
experience of agency can be preserved even when high-level feedback may alter 
individuals’ explicit judgments of agency. 
What is more intriguing about these findings, though, is the divergence in the 
intentional binding effects between the human-human and human-computer conditions. In 
the trials where participants believed the tone had been caused by the other person, 
participants demonstrated an intentional binding effect that was identical to the binding 
that they demonstrated when they believed they themselves had caused the tone. Obhi and 
Hall suggested that when two people are involved in a task together, they form an agentic 
‘we’ identity that contributes to a sense of pre-reflective agency for both people, regardless 
of who is actually responsible for the action. In response to similar findings, Wohlschläger 
and colleagues (2003) proposed that shared human action may activate a “system for 
understanding biological actions” (i.e., mirror neurons; p. 589). These findings suggest that 
although explicit agency judgments may accurately reflect the true author of a given action, 
a sense of pre-reflective agency may be preserved for both individuals who work on the 
shared task together, regardless of who is the true author of the action. However, this 




In their explanation regarding the lack of intentional binding within the human-
computer condition, Obhi and Hall (2011b) proposed the following: “the basic processes 
underlying the pre-reflective sense of agency break down, or are overridden and inhibited 
in such a way that binding does not occur, even for action effects that the participant 
(explicitly) knows they caused” (p. 668). The authors go on to suggest that it is possible in 
the human-computer condition that participants subconsciously developed a belief that 
they had no control in the task because they were unable to represent the computer’s task 
in the same way as their own task and unable to comprehend the computer’s ‘intentions’ 
as similar to their own intentions for the task. Unlike joint action between humans, in which 
the authors suggest a ‘we’ agency is formed from the ability to share the same mental model 
regarding intention for action, joint action between humans and computers does not 
preserve individuals’ intentionality for actions. The authors suggest, then, that a person’s 
lack of ability to represent the computer’s ‘intention’ for action disrupts the pre-reflective 
sense of agency, which inhibits the experience of control for the task. 
Obhi and Hall’s (2011b) findings are an important precursor to the proposed 
investigation. Although these results are experimental in nature, they provide initial 
evidence that the mechanism of agency can be negatively impacted when actions are jointly 
shared between an individual and a computer agent. I hope to extend this line of work in 
the proposed investigation in several ways. First, I suggest that in addition to disrupting the 
feeling of agency, automation may enhance the sense of agency under certain conditions. 
I seek to explore the features of automation that are both negatively and positively related 
to agency in the sections that follow. Relatedly, I seek to provide additional theorizing 




processes underlying the pre-reflective sense of agency”. I do so by providing a 
combination of theoretical and empirical evidence from various literatures to 
comprehensively address the ways in which different experiential features of automation 
may both positively and negatively impact the experience of agency. For each of the 
features to be discussed, I suggest that automation impacts the perceived match between 
one’s intentions and outcomes, which in turn influences the experience of agency. 
Therefore, I will be positing direct relationships between the features of the automation 
experience and the experience of agency, as well as the mediation of those relationships by 
the perceived match between intentions and outcomes. I will now discuss each of the 
experiential features of automation in turn. 
 Perceived Level of Automation 
Levels of automation (LoA) reflect the extent to which an automated technology 
versus a human operator is responsible for carrying out a given function or activity. In 
higher levels of automation, the technology performs most of the function, with minimal 
human input or oversight. There are a variety of taxonomies for levels of automation, many 
of which refer specifically to decision-making types of automation (Endsley, 1987; 
Sheridan & Verplank, 1978), whereas other taxonomies broadly assign levels of 
automation across various automated functions (Endsley & Kaber, 1999; R. Parasuraman 
et al., 2000). Each of these taxonomies coalesces around the notion of total human control 
versus total automation control at opposite ends of the spectrum. High levels of automation 
reduce potentials for human errors, but there is also evidence to suggest that high levels of 
automation may be coupled with diminished human operator performance under certain 




Mosier, Skitka, Heers, & Burdick, 1998; R. Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993). Endsley 
and Kiris (1995) coined the term ‘out-of-the-loop’ (OOL) performance problem to refer to 
the tendency for individuals to become less situationally aware, less vigilant, and more 
complacent within tasks coupled with high automation.  
Berberian, Le Blaye, Maille, and Sarrazin (2012) suggest that these performance 
decrements may be fundamentally related to individuals’ decreased sense of agency in 
automation-related performance tasks. Berberian and colleagues propose that individuals 
who use high levels of automation may experience lower agency because they perceive a 
reduced amount of control available to them in a task that involves a high level of 
automation. The authors suggest that the perception of reduced control causes 
disengagement from the task, which then leads to the OOL performance problem. This 
interpretation relates to Obhi and Hall’s (2011b), who proposed that participants in their 
study may have subconsciously developed a belief that they had no control in the human-
computer condition because of the inability to mentally represent the computer’s 
‘intention’ for the task. Both interpretations imply that individuals’ sense of agency is 
reduced simply because of the perception of a low amount of control available within a 
task coupled with automation, but this justification lacks precision. 
In tasks coupled with high LoA, individuals have objectively less control over a 
task and thereby are not initiating most (if any) of the actions. Instead, human operators 
who work with high LoA are simply authorizing or monitoring the functions that are 
initiated by the technology. The low task requirements for human operators under high 
LoA preclude the need for the human operator to form strong intentions for such activities. 




individuals form intentions for the work activities that they share with high automation. 
The formation of intentions is crucial to the sense of agency, because the perception of a 
match between one’s intentions and actions can only occur in the presence of an intention. 
If individuals do not form strong intentions for tasks in which they use automation, the 
ability to perceive a match between intentions and outcomes is impaired and the experience 
of agency suffers. Thus, I argue that Obhi and Hall’s interpretation is not directly relevant 
to all relationships between humans and computers but is instead reflective of the LoA of 
the computer agent with which the human is working. In the next several sections, I suggest 
alternative mechanisms by which other features of automation influence the perceived 
match between intentions and outcomes. 
There have been two experimental studies that have examined the relationship 
between LoA and the sense of agency. Berberian, Sarrazin, Le Blaye, and Haggard (2012) 
conducted an experiment in which participants completed an aircraft simulation task that 
offered differing levels of automated assistance within different trials. Judgments of agency 
were assessed explicitly by asking participants to verbally report how strongly they felt 
they had caused a given maneuver in the task on a scale from 0 (No causal involvement) to 
3 (Strong causal involvement). Intentional binding was assessed as an implicit measure of 
the feeling of agency, which included participants’ temporal estimates of the duration 
between the execution of their maneuvers and feedback about their actions. The researchers 
found that as levels of automation increased, participants’ explicit and implicit levels of 
agency decreased, suggesting that increased LoA has a negative impact on individuals’ 




Kumar and Srinivasan (2011) examined the relationship between agency and 
control in an experimental design in which the amount of control afforded to participants 
was manipulated across different trials. In this study, the researchers measured participants’ 
levels of intentional binding and self-reports of control in response to the varying amount 
of objective control offered in an experimental task. Results indicated that participants’ 
levels of self-reported control increased as the objective control offered in the task 
increased, regardless of whether they were successful in the task trial. The positive 
relationship between objective task control and subjective feelings of control can be 
directly applied to the context of automation. When using high levels of automation, a 
human operator’s level of control is necessarily decreased in favor of increased control by 
automation, which is expected to be related to diminished experiences of agency.  
Both Berberian et al. (2012) and Kumar and Srinivasan (2011) provide 
experimental support for the negative relationship between LoA and agency, and I seek to 
extend these findings by replicating them in an organizational context. This replication is 
an important first step in the proposed investigation because it cannot be assumed that the 
relationship between perceived LoA and experiences of agency will be preserved in the 
absence of a tightly controlled laboratory setting. LoA is a highly salient feature of the 
experience of working with automation and high automation is becoming more pervasive 
across different types of jobs. Participants in this study provide subjective ratings of LoA 
for the different types of automated business software that they use in their own jobs across 
a variety of tasks. Moreover, I aim to further delineate the relationship between LoA and 
agency by exploring the mediating role of perceived intention-outcome match, as I believe 




realization of intentions, which interrupts the perception of a match between one’s 
intentions and outcomes. Therefore, I propose the following:  
H1a: Perceived level of automation will be negatively related to experiences of 
agency. 
H1b: The relationship between perceived level of automation and the experiences 
of agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
 Perceived Ease of Use 
In addition to the disruption to the formation of intentions, I also contend that 
automation can impact the perception of intention-outcome match by influencing the ease 
or difficulty with which the perceived match is attained. When a person is working towards 
a goal within a performance episode, whether it be finishing a manuscript or persuading 
coworkers of a viewpoint in a team meeting, that goal can feel easy or hard, or somewhere 
in between. This perception of goal difficulty depends on a variety of contextual factors, 
such as the amount of work (task load), task complexity, amount of skill for the task, or 
individual differences in goal orientation (e.g., avoid or approach orientation; Midgley, 
Kaplan, & Middleton, 2001). For example, a person may have many confusing revisions 
to address on a manuscript, which would make the performance episode seem difficult, or 
it could be on a familiar topic and feel very easy to write. This example assumes that the 
person is independently working on the task and that the only determinants of performance 
are person or task-based. However, the technology that a person uses to perform such tasks 
must also be considered in the modern workforce. For example, individuals’ experiences 




final manuscript changes or if Skype continually cuts out when they are attempting to 
communicate with teammates. The technology that mediates a person’s work activity must 
be accounted for when examining the ease or difficulty with which a person attains desired 
performance outcomes. 
 These examples of ‘bad’ technology experiences of the crashing computer or the 
faulty internet connection highlight another concept in postphenomenology: a loss of 
transparency within an embodiment relation with technology (Rosenberger, 2009). An 
embodiment relation refers to the kinds of relationships between humans and technologies 
wherein the technical artifact recedes into the phenomenological background, allowing the 
human to experience reality through the technology. A prime example of an embodied 
relation with technology is of a person using eyeglasses – the glasses literally allow the 
person to see the world more clearly. Although a new pair of glasses might take some time 
to get used to, once a person is accustomed to a pair of eyeglasses, they might be 
experientially forgotten during normal wear. This ‘forgetting’ highlights the high degree 
of transparency within the eyeglasses. When technologies operate as they are supposed to, 
especially as we are familiar with them, technologies largely maintain a high degree of 
transparency. However, when technologies break or perhaps if they are difficult to use, the 
transparency in the technology decreases (Rosenberger, 2009).  
 Rosenberger (2009) describes the scenario of the crashing computer as one way in 
which a technology might lose its transparency. This scenario suggests that the computer 
becomes salient because its typical ‘use’ disappears and the individual’s attention must turn 
away from the task at hand and towards the tool that was previously facilitating that task. 




task for which the tool is meant to facilitate, is indicative of how much the tool will 
negatively impact the individual’s experience of agency in the activity. For example, when 
an individual is using a technology to accomplish a task and that technology is difficult to 
use, the individual must exert effort towards figuring out how to use the technology rather 
than simply focusing on the task itself. The difficult technology, then, presents on obstacle 
to one’s intended outcome, which hinders the ability to attain a match between one’s 
intentions and outcomes. Embedded in this discussion is the role of effort, which is a topic 
of debate within the sense of agency literature.  
Effort refers to perceived investments of mental and/or physical energy and will-
power into actions (Bayne & Levy, 2006). Empirically, there have been mixed results 
regarding the relationship between effort and agency. Demanet, Muhle-Karbe, Lynn, 
Blotenberg, and Brass (2013) reported a positive relationship between the sense of agency 
and effort, whereas Sidarus and Haggard (2016) and Hon, Poh, and Soon (2013) found that 
increased effort was related to decreased intentional binding and lower judgments of 
agency, respectively. Pacherie (2008) states that effort can increase the sense of agency if 
the sense of self is highly salient in the action, because of the ‘sharpened sense of self’ that 
occurs through the experience of resistance between oneself and environment. Yet, 
Pacherie also describes agency as a feeling of ‘effortless control’, wherein individuals feel 
a high sense of agency because they achieve their intended outcomes with little to no 
correction or adjustment to their original intentions or behaviors.  
Thus, both the empirical and theoretical literature are conflicted. However, given 
that the proposed investigation seeks to examine individuals’ experiences during normal 




the moments of interest. Rather, only a ‘minimal’ sense of self is associated with normal 
momentary actions, such that I am aware that I am controlling my own actions, but I am 
not consciously thinking about the action as it is embedded in the larger scope of my 
autobiographical narrative (Hohwy, 2007). Therefore, I suggest that it is more likely to 
expect a negative relationship between the sense of agency and effort, such that agency is 
increased when feelings of effort are low. Returning to the context of automation, I propose 
that the effort that a person must expend on operating a difficult-to-use technology detracts 
from the seamlessness with which one may otherwise accomplish the activity, thereby 
reducing the perceived intention-outcome match and associated experience of agency. 
Thus, I suggest that one way that this lack of seamlessness or transparency of a technology 
can be operationalized is how easy it is to use. 
The perceived ease of use of a technology (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000) has been 
extensively examined in the information technology (IT) literature and has been defined as 
“the extent to which a person believes that using the [technology] will be free of effort” 
(Venkatesh & Davis, 2000, p. 187). There is robust evidence that perceived ease of use, 
(along with perceived usefulness, which will be discussed in the next section), strongly 
influences individuals’ intentions to use technology, as well as their ultimate usage 
behaviors (King & He, 2006; Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003; Turner, Kitchenham, Brereton, 
Charters, & Budgen, 2010). In past theoretical work on the topic, the relationship between 
perceived ease of use and usage behaviors has been unquestioned – of course if a 
technology is easier to use, people will use it more. However, I suggest that an important 
explanatory factor in individuals’ tendency towards using ‘easy’ technology is because 




that is difficult to use diminishes experiences of agency. An easy-to-use technology 
enhances the ease with which one can achieve one’s outcomes, whereas a difficult-to-use 
technology presents an obstacle to the achievement of one’s outcomes. Thus, I propose the 
following: 
H2a: The perceived ease of use of an automation will be positively related to 
experiences of agency. 
H2b: The relationship between perceived ease of use and the experiences of 
agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
 Perceived Usefulness 
Closely related to the perceived ease of use of a technology is the perception of its 
usefulness, which is defined as “the extent to which a person believes that using the 
[technology] will enhance his or her job performance” (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000, p. 187). 
As mentioned above, perceived usefulness is also a primary determinant of individuals’ 
intentions for use and usage behaviors of technology within the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). An automated technology used at work may be 
perceived as useful for several reasons. Perhaps an automated technology allows a person 
to complete tasks that would otherwise not be possible or to handle a larger workload in a 
shorter amount of time or to examine data in new ways. Regardless of the reason, the mere 
fact of a technology’s perceived usefulness implies that it is perceived as enabling one’s 
performance at work. Conversely, the extent to which an automation is perceived as not 
useful highlights the extent to which it may constrain a person’s outcomes at work. 




workflow, he or she may feel limited by the automation rather than enabled. This feeling 
of being limited or constrained implies a perceived difficulty in achieving one’s desired 
outcomes, which I suggest will negatively impact a person’s feelings of control.  
Within the postphenomenology literature, Kiran (2015) proposes that technologies 
have a two-sidedness, which means that while technologies can bring certain things to our 
attention or enable certain actions, they are simultaneously pushing other things outside of 
our focus. One dimension of technology that Kiran describes as two-sided is the ‘enabling-
constraining’ nature of technologies. Kiran states that technologies are both enabling and 
constraining, such that while technologies allow us to perform certain actions, they also 
constrain our actions by shaping how we perform them. By shaping how we perform 
actions, technologies constrain the repertoire of all of the possible ways that a certain task 
could feasibly be completed. Applied to the current context, automated technologies that 
are perceived as useful can be understood as ‘enabling’ agentic behaviors, that is, allowing 
individuals to achieve their desired outcomes in an efficient or desired manner. The 
perception of a useful technology suggests that the ‘enabling’ aspects of the technology are 
important to one’s job and are salient to the individual worker. That is, the technology is 
shaping one’s behaviors in a way that is perceived to be efficient and helpful to one’s 
workflow. Alternatively, automated technologies that are perceived as being not useful can 
be understood as constraining workers’ agency, such that they represent an obstacle 
between one’s intentions and desired outcomes. Perhaps the automated technology requires 
a person to make several unnecessary clicks or is extremely slow or prevents a person from 
working on tasks that are perceived as more important or interesting. Whatever the exact 




proposed to be shaping the person’s behavior in such a way that desired outcomes become 
more difficult to attain.  
Like the argument provided for perceived ease of use, I suggest that useful 
technologies enhance the ease with which desired outcomes can be attained, which makes 
the perception of a match between one’s intentions and outcomes more likely to occur. 
Whereas easy-to-use technologies enhance perceived intention-outcome match by 
allowing individuals to stay focused on their tasks (rather than on the technologies), useful 
technologies do so by enabling behaviors that are productive or important to one’s job. 
Relatedly, to the extent that useful technologies enhance perceptions of a match between 
intentions and outcomes, it is expected that the experience of control will be increased as 
well. Thus, I propose the following: 
H3a. The perceived usefulness of an automation will be positively related to the 
experience of agency. 
H3b: The relationship between perceived usefulness and the experiences of 
agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
 Perceived Reliability 
Perceived reliability refers to the extent to which a person feels that an automated 
technology is functioning the way it is supposed to (without risk of technical failure or 
misinformation, for example). Human factors research on this topic has typically focused 
on the relationship between perceptions of reliability in an automation and resulting trust 
of the automation (R. Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Lee and Moray (1994; 1992) were of 




works much of the same way as it does with other humans: the more reliable that the 
automation tends to be, the greater trust that individuals place in it. Trust in automation has 
important implications for the ways in which individuals choose to use automated 
technologies, or if they choose to use the technologies at all (Dixon, Wickens, & McCarley, 
2007; Muir & Moray, 1996; R. Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008). However, the 
reliability of an automation has important implications for individuals’ experiences of 
agency as well. Reliable technologies give users greater confidence that a given action will 
produce the expected effect. In other words, reliable technologies are more predictable. 
Predictability is an important component underlying the sense of agency, and it is the 
mechanism by which I suggest reliable technologies influence agentic experiences. 
The predictability of an action’s outcome underlies the emergence of agency 
because it represents a confirmation of one’s belief that he or she has achieved what was 
originally intended for a given action. In other words, if a person can predict or have a clear 
notion of what the outcome of a certain action will be, when that outcome does in fact 
occur, the person feels a strong sense of agency for that action. This notion has been 
explored at the sensorimotor level, and researchers have suggested that the sense of 
‘predictability’ for action stems from matches between one’s intentions and outcomes at a 
series of sensorimotor levels (Engbert et al., 2008). A proponent of the predictive argument 
regarding the emergence of the sense of agency, Moore (2016) states that actions begin 
with intentions that provide a prediction of the desired state of the motor system once the 
action is complete, and the sense of agency arises if there is a match between the predicted 
and actual state of the system. Although proponents of the reductionist argument would 




actions (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999), it is without question that the experience of one’s 
intentions and one’s actions is that of prediction, which is the focus of the current 
proposition. 
These notions of reliability and predictability are pertinent to the experience of 
agency while working with automation. When a person works with an automated 
technology, that experience is going to be influenced by the extent to which that person 
can successfully predict what will occur from various actions with that automation. For 
example, if a technology always functions as it is supposed to, a person can reliably predict 
what the outcome of one’s actions will be and the experience of agency in that task is 
preserved. For example, if I know that pushing a button on my computer will always cause 
it to shut down, my sense of agency will be maintained when I push the button and it does, 
in fact, shut down. Alternatively, if an automated technology often breaks or provides 
inaccurate guidance, the person’s ability to predict the future outcomes of a given action is 
decreased and the experience of agency following that action suffers. If I push the button 
on my computer and expect it to shut down – and it does not shut down – I am left confused 
and have a decreased experience of control following that action than if the button were to 
have functioned properly. Accordingly, I suggest that reliable technologies enhance the 
likelihood of attaining a match between one’s intentions and outcomes because of 
increased predictability, which is in turn related to greater experiences of control. Thus, I 
propose the following: 
H4a. The perceived reliability of an automation will be positively related to the 




H4b: The relationship between perceived reliability and the experiences of agency 
will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
 Experience & Skill 
The final property of the experience of automation that I will explore relates to the 
individual’s level of experience and skill with the technology. Like the perceived reliability 
of an automated technology, I argue that the experience or skill of a human operator with 
a given automated technology can influence his or her experience of agency through the 
mechanism of predictability. Beyond the cognitive underpinnings, the phenomenon of 
predictability within agency is relatable at a behavioral level, for example, with the action 
of a basketball shot. An experienced basketball player, like Steph Curry, has a much better 
ability to predict whether a certain shot will go into a basketball hoop than a novice player 
who is shooting a basketball for the first time. These two players have drastically different 
experiences of agency for the same activity – the experienced player has a much stronger 
experience of agency than the novice because of the extent to which he can predict the 
outcome of his action (i.e., the basketball going into the hoop). The difference in experience 
and skill levels between these two players is indicative of both 1) the difference in their 
abilities to predict the outcomes of their basketball shots and 2) the difference in their 
experiences of control for those basketball shots.  
This experience also applies to technologically-mediated actions at work. For 
example, if a person acquires a new technology in his or her job, the experience might be 
initially frustrating to one’s agency because the person does not know how to operate the 




technology over time, the person’s experience of agency increases in tandem with 
increased knowledge and exposure to the various contextual factors and outcomes 
associated with operating that technology. Both experience and skill are fundamentally 
related to the person’s ability to predict what will occur when using the technology, which 
enhances the perceived match between one’s intentions and outcomes and concomitant 
experiences of control. Thus, I propose the following: 
H5a. The experience and skill level of the human operator of an automation will 
be positively related his or her experience of agency with that technology. 
H5b: The relationship between experience/skill and the experiences of agency 





CHAPTER 4. TRAITS AND TASK CHARACTERISTICS 
So far, I have explored five major properties of the experience of working with 
automation that are proposed to impact the experience of agency. Each of these properties 
is posited to influence some aspect of the perceived match between a person’s intentions 
and outcomes for their work activities, which in turn influences the experiences of control 
related to those activities. However, it is not suggested that these relationships are 
invariable across different workers and work contexts. Conversely, I suspect that the 
relationships between the experiential features of automation and experiences of agency 
may differ between individuals with different trait-level tendencies, as well between 
different types of tasks.  
In this section, I explore three individual difference factors that may influence 
workers’ perceptions of automated technologies (beyond the actual properties of the 
technologies themselves): affinity for technology, age, and technology self-efficacy. 
Although there is simply not as much theoretical or empirical evidence to guide these 
hypotheses as the previous set of hypotheses, I review the extant support and limitations 
for each of these proposed relationships. Additionally, I briefly describe exploratory 
analyses that introduce the moderating role of task characteristics on the relationship 
between features of the experience with automation and the experience of agency.  
 Affinity for Technology 
The current investigation is primarily interested in understanding the momentary 




it is recognized that individuals have different generalized orientations towards technology 
(Edison & Geissler, 2003). Some people consider themselves to be ‘tech-savvy’, whereas 
others prefer to avoid new technological advancements at all costs. Affinity for technology 
is a construct that denotes a positive affect towards different types of technology (Edison 
& Geissler, 2003), although there has not been much research on this topic. Most research 
on this topic has focused on people’s attitudes towards specific IT technologies under the 
broader context of IT adoption (Venkatesh & Bala, 2008; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). 
Venkatesh (2000) reported that various self-referent beliefs and attitudes regarding 
computers, including computer self-efficacy and perceived enjoyment, were significant 
predictors of the perceived ease of use of new computer systems, which was in turn related 
to participants’ perceived usefulness of those systems. Moreover, other research has shown 
that individuals’ generalized attitudes towards the trustworthiness of automation can 
impact their perceptions of the reliability of specific automated systems (Pop, Shrewsbury, 
& Durso, 2015). However, these outcomes have not been directly examined in relation to 
affinity for technology, nor have the other two features of the experience with automation 
included in the proposed investigation. 
It is expected, though, that better liking of technology, generally, will be associated 
with more favorable perceptions of the technology used in one’s job. Affinity for 
technology can be understood as a prepotent disposition that inclines individuals towards 
more favorable perceptions of technology, which I suggest will have a positive influence 
on momentary experiences of technology used in one’s work role. I expect that affinity for 
technology will influence the features of the automation experience that are most closely 




usefulness, and reliability. The perception of level of automation reflects a judgment of the 
labor division between the technology and the self, whereas experience and skill with the 
technology reflect self-evaluations regarding one’s exposure and abilities with the 
technology. These two features are not expected to be significantly related to affinity for 
technology, as they do not denote any positive or negative value judgment regarding the 
technology itself. Thus, I propose the following exploratory hypotheses: 
H6a-c. There will be positive relationships between affinity for technology and (a) 
perceived ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability. 
 Age  
Another individual difference variable that has been examined in relation to 
technology is age. In general, past research has indicated that individuals’ attitudes and 
usage of technology decline as they get older (Czaja et al., 2006; Czaja & Sharit, 1998; 
Morris & Venkatesh, 2000; Niehaves & Plattfaut, 2014). Older adults have been shown to 
have lower computer self-efficacy (Czaja et al., 2006; Czaja & Sharit, 1998; Niehaves & 
Plattfaut, 2014), higher computer anxiety (Czaja et al., 2006), and lower usage behaviors 
of different technologies (Czaja et al., 2006; Morris & Venkatesh, 2000) than younger 
adults. Age is an important factor in the workplace because baby boomers represent 
approximately one-third of the current workforce (Fry, 2018). Individuals are living longer 
and, therefore, working longer, and there is still much that is not understood about the aging 
workforce (Hedge, Borman, & Lammlein, 2006). However, there has not been any 
empirical or theoretical research to inform formal hypotheses regarding the relationship 




That being said, given that past trends have indicated that older adults are more 
reluctant to embrace new technologies (Hanson, 2010; Morris & Venkatesh, 2000), it is 
suggested here that ‘automated’ technologies as examined in the proposed study would be 
no different. Specifically, for those features of the experience with automation that reflect 
positive or negative perceptions of the functionality of the technology – including 
perceived ease of use, usefulness, and reliability – it is expected that older adults will report 
more negative perceptions, on average, than younger adults. It is not expected that age will 
have a significant relationship to the perceived level of automation nor experience and skill, 
for the same reasons mentioned above for affinity for technology. Thus, I seek to test the 
following propositions in an exploratory fashion:  
H7a-c.  There will be negative relationships between age and (a) perceived ease of 
use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability.  
 Technology Self-Efficacy 
Self-efficacy refers to the degree to which individuals believe in their ability to 
successfully execute certain behaviors to produce desired outcomes (Bandura, 1977). 
Bandura proposed that self-efficacy is likely domain-specific, such that an individual who 
has high self-efficacy in math does not necessarily have high self-efficacy in reading. 
Accordingly, it is possible that individuals may have high or low self-efficacy in 
technologically-mediated activities. Computer self-efficacy has been examined as a pre-
determinant to the TAM and was found to be a significant predictor of perceived ease of 
use and indirectly related to perceived usefulness through perceived ease of use 




Schmidt (2012) also reported positive relationships between computer self-efficacy and 
perceived ease of use and usefulness, as well as computer skill.  
Given these findings, it is expected that technology self-efficacy will be positively 
related to perceived ease of use and usefulness in the proposed investigation. I do not expect 
that technology self-efficacy will be related to perceived level of automation or one’s 
subjective level of experience, for similar reasons as provided for the prior two sets of 
hypotheses. However, as self-efficacy is directly relevant to a person’s belief in his or her 
own abilities, it is expected that there will be a positive relationship between technology 
self-efficacy and subjective skill. In other words, the belief in one’s ability to do something 
well should be highly correlated with the endorsement of one’s subjective ability for that 
activity. Thus, I propose the following: 
H8a-c. There will be positive relationships between technology self-efficacy and 
(a) perceived ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) subjective skill. 
 Task Characteristics 
The proposed investigation will also include exploratory analyses involving task 
characteristics. There are a wide variety of tasks within any person’s job, that range on how 
enjoyable, engaging, and interesting they are, and those task characteristics may influence 
the nature of the relationship between automation and agency, beyond any of the features 
of automation themselves. A research question of the proposed investigation is whether the 
context of task type within a performance episode significantly moderates the relationships 
between the features of automation and the experience of agency. Although there are no 




including task difficulty, task enjoyment, task importance, and task intrinsic interest, will 
be explored in the proposed research design. It is possible that these task characteristics 
may serve as meaningful control variables given the exploratory nature of proposed 
investigation, so they will be included to allow for a comprehensive examination of the 
nature of experiences with automation within naturally occurring tasks in people’s 






CHAPTER 5. WELL-BEING OUTCOMES 
In addition to examining the antecedents and moderators of the relationship 
between automation and agency, I am also interested in examining well-being outcomes 
that may be partially determined by individuals’ experiences of agency in their work. The 
indicators of well-being that will be examined in the proposed study include positive affect, 
authenticity, and job engagement. It is possible that the features of automated technologies 
also influence these outcomes, mediated partially or fully by experiences of agency, 
although there has not been sufficient research in relevant domains to warrant evidence-
based propositions along these lines. Therefore, only the direct relationships between 
experiences of agency and the well-being outcomes will be formally hypothesized. The 
relationships between the experiential features of automation and well-being outcomes will 
be examined in an exploratory manner, including tests of mediation by agency experiences. 
I will discuss each of the proposed outcomes in turn. 
 Positive Affect 
Despite the clear tie between action and emotion experiences, there has not been 
much research on the relationship between the sense of agency and affective states 
(Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). However, the small body of work that has been done in this 
area generally indicates that the sense of agency is related to more positive affective 
outcomes (Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2017; Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Gentsch, Weiss, 
Spengler, Synofzik, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2015; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013, 2017). Most of 
this work has focused on how the valence of an action’s outcomes, either positive or 




of agency is increased following positively-valenced outcomes and decreased following 
negatively-valenced outcomes. Gentsch and Synofzik (2014) have suggested that these 
results may reflect a self-serving bias, in which individuals are more likely to attribute 
positive outcomes to their own actions and negative outcomes to factors outside their 
control. By attributing positive outcomes to oneself, individuals are acting to protect their 
self-esteem and to reduce experiences of cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009). These studies provide some support for similar findings in the 
current study, although there are important differences to note. Specifically, the studies 
referenced here all examined the relationship between the sense of agency and the positive 
or negative valence of the outcome of one’s actions, rather than individuals’ affective 
states. 
 However, it would be consistent that positive outcomes would be associated with 
positive affective states (and the same for negative outcomes), suggesting that positive 
affective states would be associated with a greater experience of agency. Moreover, given 
that people typically intend for positive (rather than negative) outcomes for their work 
activities, it should follow that individuals who perceive a high match between their 
intentions and outcomes for a given work activity would also experience more positive 
affect in those situations. The findings noted thus far about the sense of agency and affect 
have all been experimental in nature, although there has been considerable research that 
has examined the relationships between more stable control constructs and well-being in 
the workplace. These studies have shown that people generally report higher levels of well-
being, both at work and generally, when they feel like they are in control of their lives (i.e., 




both at the sensorimotor level and at the trait-level, is broadly associated with more positive 
affective experiences. Taken together, these findings support the following proposition: 
H9. There will be a positive relationship between experiences of agency and 
positive affect.  
 Authenticity  
Authenticity refers to the feeling of being true to oneself (Metin, Taris, Peeters, van 
Beek, & van den Bosch, 2016). The construct of authenticity has been conceptualized as 
both a trait, reflecting the general tendency to act in accordance with one’s true self across 
a variety of situations (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & 
Joseph, 2008), and as a state, which reflects a person’s feeling of acting true to oneself in 
a particular moment (Lenton, Slabu, & Sedikides, 2016; Sedikides, Lenton, Slabu, & 
Thomaes, 2018). Metin, Taris, Peeters, van Beek, and van den Bosch (2016) found that 
authenticity was positively related to work engagement, job satisfaction and performance 
and that feelings of autonomy in one’s work role was significantly related to all three 
dimensions of authenticity they tested. Conversely, Erickson and Wharton (1997) found 
that feelings of inauthenticity were related to increased depression among workers in 
interactive service occupations, but that individuals who had more control over how they 
completed their work experienced less inauthenticity in those service roles, which provided 
a buffer against feelings of depression. These results suggest that individuals who have the 
ability to exert more influence over their work environments also have higher experiences 




Therefore, it should follow that individuals who experience more control in the 
moment also experience higher levels of authenticity. An explanation for these results may 
be due to the underlying comparative mechanisms within each of these constructs. Within 
agency, there is a comparison between one’s intentions and outcomes that leads to low or 
high experiences of agency, depending on the extent to which intentions and outcomes 
match. Authenticity entails the comparison of one’s actual and ‘true’ selves to understand 
the extent to which one has been authentic or inauthentic in one’s behaviors. These two 
experiential states go hand in hand. The extent to which one satisfies one’s intentions 
should emerge simultaneously with one’s feelings of being true to oneself if a person is 
successfully carrying out his or her true intentions. Conversely, if individuals are unable to 
achieve their goals within their work, they may also feel as though they are being 
inauthentic to themselves due to their inability to realize their intentions in their outcomes. 
Thus, I propose the following: 
H10. There will be a positive relationship between experiences of agency and 
feelings of authenticity. 
 Work Engagement 
There are many definitions of work engagement, although a commonly accepted 
definition states that engagement is “a positive, fulfilling, work-related state of mind that 
is characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption” (Schaufeli, Salanova, Bakker, & 
Gonzalez-Roma, 2002). Multiple theoretical models suggest that work engagement is a 
positive outcome of job resources (Bakker, Schaufeli, Leiter, & Taris, 2008; Britt, 




Leiter, 2008). Job resources are broadly conceptualized as “psychological, social, or 
organizational aspects of the job that are either/or: functional in achieving work goals, 
reduce job demands and the associated physiological and psychological costs, stimulate 
personal growth, learning, and development” (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007, p. 312). A 
fundamental job resource is individuals’ feelings of autonomy or control in their jobs, 
typically operationalized as the amount of control a person has over the way their work is 
completed. Control in one’s job has consistently been shown to be one of the most 
significant predictors of work engagement (Crawford, LePine, & Rich, 2010; Hakanen, 
Bakker, & Schaufeli, 2006; Koyuncu, Burke, & Fiksenbaum, 2006; Mauno, Kinnunen, & 
Ruokolainen, 2007; Saks, 2015), which emphasizes the important role that control plays in 
well-being at work.  Of course, the ways in which ‘control’ has been examined in these 
studies reflects the amount of control offered in one’s job, rather than momentary feelings 
of control as assessed from the first-person perspective. This study aims to extend this past 
research to examine the relationship between momentary feelings of control within agency 
and work engagement. I expect that individuals’ momentary feelings of control tied to 
various performance episodes will accumulate to reflect higher levels of work engagement, 
whereas individuals who do not experience control within their daily work tasks are 
expected to report more distanced feelings about their work.  
H11. There will be a positive relationship between the experience of agency and 
work engagement. 




The complete theoretical model that is tested in the proposed investigation can be 
seen in Figure 1. The primary purpose of the current research is to illuminate the 
psychological impact of automated technologies on the experience of work by examining 
the direct relationships between the experiential features of automation and experienced 
control (not shown in Figure 1 to reduce confusion) and the indirect relationships between 
those constructs through perceived intention-outcome match. The secondary hypotheses in 
this study involve examining trait-level predictors of experiences of automation and 
proximal well-being outcomes of experiences of agency. Here is a full list of the hypotheses 
tested in the current study:  
H1a: Perceived level of automation will be negatively related to experiences of 
agency. 
H1b: The relationship between perceived level of automation and the experiences 
of agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
H2a: The perceived ease of use of an automation will be positively related to 
experiences of agency. 
H2b: The relationship between perceived ease of use and the experiences of 
agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
H3a. The perceived usefulness of an automation will be positively related to the 
experience of agency. 
H3b: The relationship between perceived usefulness and the experiences of 
agency will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
H4a. The perceived reliability of an automation will be positively related to the 




H4b: The relationship between perceived reliability and the experiences of agency 
will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
H5a. The experience and skill level of the human operator of an automation will 
be positively related his or her experience of agency with that technology. 
H5b: The relationship between experience/skill and the experiences of agency 
will be mediated by perceived intention-outcome match. 
H6a-c. There will be positive relationships between affinity for technology and (a) 
perceived ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability. 
H7a-c.  There will be negative relationships between age and (a) perceived ease of 
use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability.  
H8a-c. There will be positive relationships between technology self-efficacy and 
(a) perceived ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) subjective skill. 
H9. There will be a positive relationship between experiences of agency and 
positive affect.  
H10. There will be a positive relationship between experiences of agency and 
feelings of authenticity. 













































CHAPTER 6. METHOD 
This study explored the experiential role of automation in the workplace by 
examining workers’ experiences of using automated business software within performance 
episodes across three workdays. I will first describe what is meant by ‘automated business 
software’ and then give a brief description and motivation of the use of experience 
sampling method (ESM) for this the study, before turning to the sample, procedure, and 
materials used in the study.  
 Automated Business Software 
To measure the experiential impact of automation in the workplace, this study 
examined full-time workers’ experiences of agency while using automated business 
software in their daily work activities. Automated business software, also referred to as 
business automation software and business process automation, is a broad class of 
technology that refers to any software developed to automate business processes and 
improve workflows. Automated business software was operationalized in the current study 
as any computerized software that automates some aspect(s) of workers’ required tasks, 
including information acquisition, information analysis, decision selection, and action 
implementation. I conducted a pilot study in part to determine whether I could limit the 
automated business software in the current study to those used for a single function (e.g., 
decision selection). In the pilot study, participants reported using automated business 
software for multiple functions, even within the same task, so the current study included 




were also able to indicate additional functionality after each use. A full description of the 
pilot study, including the results, can be found in Appendix A.  
 Some examples of automated business software that would qualify for inclusion in 
the study are customer relationship management (CRM) software (e.g., Salesforce), 
automated accounting software (e.g., FreshBooks), and HR management software (e.g., 
Zenefits). CRM software, for example, is a very popular tool that allows organizations to 
automate many aspects of customer management. Without a CRM software, a salesperson 
may be independently responsible for keeping track of customer histories and reaching out 
to those customers at regular intervals or when customers threaten to leave. With a CRM 
software, a salesperson can use the software solution to store and organize customer 
information and the CRM software can provide notifications when customers perform 
certain actions (e.g., clicking on a ‘pricing’ page on the company website). Some CRM 
solutions, like Salesforce, use artificial intelligence to track “key leads” and provide 
suggested actions to maintain and build customer relationships.  
 A broad class of technology was chosen for the current study to capture variance 
in the experiences of automation. As with any other industry, different providers and types 
of automated business software were expected to range in the extent and quality of their 
offerings and functionalities, and these differences were expected to contribute to 
differences in individuals’ experiences with those technologies. Moreover, the inclusion of 
a variety of automated business software allowed for an examination of the proposed 
relationships across a variety of jobs. A primary goal of the current research was to outline 




by examining a broad class of automated technologies, rather than limiting the 
investigation to a single technology or work role.  
I did not expect that I would be familiar with every business automation software 
that would be eligible for the study at the outset of the investigation, so each technology 
was examined on a case-by-case basis (for the list of eligible automated business software 
that was continually updated throughout the study, please see Appendix B). As will be 
described in greater detail in the Procedure section, I conducted phone screenings to 
provide potential participants with examples of eligible automated business software and 
to screen for ineligible software. Examples of software that were not eligible for the current 
study included Microsoft Office Suite products (e.g., Word, PowerPoint, Outlook) and any 
internal communication software (e.g., Slack) or external communication software (e.g., 
Gmail). The Microsoft Office Suite products were not eligible because of the ubiquity of 
those tools in both work and nonwork settings and the wide range of uses for those tools. 
Communication tools were not eligible for the current research because the potential range 
of ‘communication tasks’ was too broad and fell beyond the scope of a performance 
episode that involves a specific task-related goal with a defined start and end time.  
 Experience Sampling Method 
This study used experience sampling methodology (ESM) to examine participants’ 
momentary experiences of agency within performance episodes that involved automated 
business software across three workdays. ESM was used to capture the experiential 
constructs (i.e., experiences of agency, task characteristics, and momentary well-being 




retrospective accounts. The use of a one-time survey for the current research questions 
would have been too far removed from the experience of working with automation and 
associated phenomenology, which would lead to distortions in participants’ self-reports of 
those phenomena. For example, if a researcher were interested in understanding students’ 
test-taking anxiety, it would be more appropriate to capture those experiences when they 
occur (directly before a test), rather than by polling students at a random moment in the 
semester. Certain students’ responses could be biased after a particularly hard test, others 
by a particularly easy test, not to mention differences in time since test-taking and 
intervening experiences. Individuals’ reports of their momentary experiences are least 
biased when they are captured as they occur, rather than through a random, one-time drop-
in, which was the primary motivation for the use of ESM in this study.  
In the performance episode surveys, participants only reported about their 
experiences of using a single automated business software throughout the duration of the 
study, even if they used many different types of software in their jobs. As such, 
participants’ experiences of automation and concomitant experiences of agency were not 
expected to vary much within-person, even though the measurement of within-person 
trends is the most common use of ESM. The three-day ESM design was used to gain more 
robust estimates of individuals’ experiences of automated business software in their work 
roles, rather than only examining responses from a single work day. This sampling strategy 
was designed to buffer some of the potential variance that could have contributed to 
individuals’ reports of their experiences of agency that were not due to the technology in 
their jobs. For example, one workday may have been particularly frustrating because of a 




friendly coworkers. The choice of three versus four workdays was somewhat arbitrary, 
although, given the potential for habitual responses among participants over a prolonged 
data collection, particularly given that the performance episode surveys stayed the same, a 
short study duration was preferred. Additionally, it was not critical for the current design 
to achieve many within-person observations across a full workweek or multiple workweeks 
because the performance episode responses were ultimately aggregated to the person-level 
to examine between-person trends among the proposed relationships. 
Although the resulting analyses based on the aggregated data do not reflect 
momentary, dynamic within-person relationships between the variables of interest, they 
still reflect the relationships between momentary experiential constructs. To return to the 
test-taking anxiety example, it is possible that the researcher would want to gain a more 
accurate picture of students’ test-taking anxiety by measuring students’ test-related stress 
over the course of the semester. If the researcher then aggregated each students’ reports to 
obtain one score per student, the researcher would not be able to examine changes within-
students across time, which is the typical use for ESM, but the resulting data would still 
reflect the momentary experiences of test-taking anxiety in a more psychologically precise 
manner than if the same construct were examined by administering a one-time survey to 
students at a random time in the semester. I aimed for such precision in the measurement 
of agency and the other experiential variables of interest in the current study, although 
between-person relationships were ultimately of primary interest because of the inclusion 
of only a single automated technology per participant. 
The experience sampling portion of the study was preceded by an online orientation 




as well as their typical experiences of the automated business software in their jobs. The 
items assessing the experiential features of automation were included in the orientation to 
reduce the concern for common method bias that could occur from measuring all constructs 
at the same time within the same survey (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
Although participants also rated the experiential features of automation within the 
performance episode surveys as well, to help account for any experiential discrepancies 
(e.g., the software malfunctions for the first time), these ratings were averaged with the 
orientation ratings to create a composite score. The details of the aggregation methods are 
described in greater detail below in the Data Analytic Strategy section. 
 Participants  
Participants for this study were recruited from the Work Experience Lab participant 
database, online ads (i.e., Facebook, LinkedIn, Reddit), and word-of-mouth. To be eligible 
for the study, participants had to live and work in the United States, work at least 30 hours 
per week (full-time), own a smartphone device, and confirm that they used automated 
business software within performance episodes in their daily or almost-daily work 
experiences. Prior to data collection, I conducted a power analysis in MPlus5 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 2007) using a Monte Carlo simulation to determine the appropriate sample size 
for the study based on a path analysis of the entire theoretical model displayed in Figure 1.   
For the power analysis, the estimated effects for the proposed relationships were 
set to .30, except for the relationship between perceived intention-outcome match and 
agency, which was set to .60. The latter relationship was set to .60 based on previous data 




outcome match predicting the experience of control. The other relationships in the power 
analysis were set to .30 to represent moderate effects. The residual variances of all 
endogenous variables in the model were set to .9 and all exogenous variables were set to 
1, based on examples from prior research (Lane, Hennes, & West, 2016; Thoemmes, 
MacKinnon, & Reiser, 2010). With a sample size set at 75 participants, the estimated power 
to detect the proposed effects ranged from .68 to .99, with an average estimated power of 
.81. I aimed to recruit 80-85 participants to account for possible participant attrition. A total 
of 85 participants completed the online orientation, but four participants failed to complete 
the ESM portion of the study, resulting in a final sample size of 81 full-time workers.  
All participants were above the age of 18 years old, lived and worked in the United 
States, and used automated business software in their work roles. Participants held a variety 
of different job titles, such as Biomedical Technician, Staff Engineer, and Strategic 
Account Manager, and they used a variety of different types of automated software, 
including Salesforce, Jira, and Margo (for a full list of automated business software 
included in the study, see Appendix B). Most of the sample was female (60%) and 
Caucasian (60%), and the average age of the sample was 33.69 years (SD = 9.66). Over 
half of the participants (51%) reported holding a bachelor’s degree, 28% reported holding 
a master’s degree and 6% reported holding a professional or doctoral degree. Participants 
worked an average of 43.10 hours per week (SD = 6.49), and the average tenure in their 





Participants were first required to complete a short phone screening (about 10 
minutes in length) to determine if they were eligible to participate in the study (for phone 
screening script, see Appendix C). If participants were determined to be eligible from the 
phone screening, they were then sent the online orientation via email. The online 
orientation included the informed consent for the study, some trait-level questionnaires, 
and instructions for how to complete the daily survey portion of the study. The daily survey 
instructions included information about how to download the survey app, MetricWire, 
which participants used to complete the performance episode surveys and the exit survey. 
Participants were reminded at the beginning and at the end of the online orientation that 
they could reach out to me at any time if they had questions or trouble with any aspect of 
the study. 
After participants completed the online orientation and notified me to let me know 
they had finished, participants were able to begin the daily survey (ESM) portion of the 
study. The daily survey portion of the study lasted for a total of three workdays (that may 
not have been consecutive, depending on participants’ use of automated software in their 
work tasks and/or ability to respond to the daily surveys). During this part of the study, 
participants completed one event-signaled survey during each workday to report a 
performance episode in which they used the automated business software that they 
described in the online orientation. The performance episode surveys contained items about 
the experiential features of automation, experiences of agency, positive affect, work 
engagement, authenticity, and task characteristics.  
The items regarding experiential features of automation were included to examine 




within the performance episode surveys and the ratings provided in the online orientation. 
This feature helped to adjust for any technological issues that participants may have 
encountered (e.g., the technology breaks for the first time) that would not be accounted for 
in their orientation responses. After participants completed three performance episode 
surveys, they were asked to complete the exit survey. The exit survey several open-ended 
items that allowed participants to report their experiences in the study, their opinion about 
what the study was about, and a space to provide their mailing address to receive their 
compensation. 
Compensation for this study was based on the extent of participation. Participants 
earned $15 for completing the online orientation, $5 for each performance episode survey, 
and $5 for the exit survey, for a total possible compensation of $35. If participants did not 
complete all portions of the study, their compensation reflected the components of the 
study that they did complete (e.g., completing the online orientation and one performance 
episode survey would earn a participant $20).  
6.4.1 Orientation Measures 
6.4.1.1 Experiential features of automation.  
The experiential features of automation were measured along the following five 
dimensions: perceived level of automation, perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, 
perceived reliability, and the level of experience/skill of the participant with the 
technology. To assess perceived level of automation, participants were shown the 10-level 
decision-making automation taxonomy by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000). 




aid in the design and research of automation as it is used by humans in various performance 
contexts. However, given the straightforward nature of the scale (See Appendix D), it was 
utilized in the current study to aid participants’ understanding and concomitant ratings of 
the level of automation of the technologies they used in their own jobs. Using this 
taxonomy as a visual aid, I developed an item for this study in which participants rated the 
level of automation of the automated software in their own work roles on a 10-point scale 
that ranges from 1 (No automation – total human control) to 10 (Total automation – no 
human control).   
Perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness were measured using eight items 
from the TAM2 measurement scales (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000). Perceived ease of use 
was measured with four items (e.g., “My interaction with the system is clear and 
understandable”) and perceived usefulness was measured with four items (e.g., “Using the 
system improves my performance in my job”). These two constructs have been examined 
in past research as predeterminants of intentions to use technology and actual technology 
usage behaviors (Lee et al., 2003), and internal consistencies for the scales have ranged 
from .86 to .98 for perceived ease of use and from .87 to .98 for perceived usefulness. The 
internal consistency of perceived ease of use was notably lower in the current study, 
average α = .73, although the internal consistency of perceived usefulness was consistent 
with past research, average α = .93. These measures have not been used in an ESM context 
before, which could account for the heightened variability among items within the 
perceived ease of use scale. The term ‘system’ was replaced with the names of the 




scale on a scale of 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) and the full scales are 
available in Appendix D. 
Perceived reliability was measured using a total of three items (average α = .90). 
Two items were taken from the Checklist for Trust between People and Automation (Jian, 
Bisantz, Drury, & Llinas, 1998): “The system is reliable” and “The system is dependable”. 
Both items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely). 
The third item was inspired by Yagoda and Gillan’s (2012) human-robot interaction (HRI) 
scale and assessed perceived consistency: “The system is consistent”. This item was 
measured on the 7-point Likert scale referenced above. Although these items had not been 
examined together in past research, there was high internal consistency among them 
(average α = .90), suggesting that they jointly reflected the same construct. The term 
‘system’ was replaced with the names of the automated software that participants provided.  
Participants’ levels of experience and skill with the automated software in their jobs 
were measured with two items that I developed for the current investigation. Experience 
was measured by asking participants to report their familiarity with the automated software 
in their jobs with the following item: “How familiar are you with the technology?”, on a 
scale from 1 (Not at all familiar) to 5 (Very familiar).  Skill was assessed with one item, 
“Please rate your level of skill with the [software]”, on a scale from 1 (Not at all skilled) to 
5 (Highly skilled). The experience and skill variables were grouped together within the 
same hypothesis because they were assumed to be strongly correlated, and indeed they 
were, r = 0.82. For the following analyses, I created a composite score of these two 




participants’ proficiency with their respective automated business software. The composite 
score will be referred to as “Experience/Skill” in subsequent descriptions.  
6.4.1.2 Affinity for technology  
Affinity for technology, or ‘technology optimism,’ was measured with the 10-item 
Affinity for Technology scale developed by Edison and Geissler (2003). This scale assesses 
individuals’ level of positive affect towards technology based on items that were inspired 
from past research on attitudes towards technology (Brosnan, 1998; Heinssen, Glass, & 
Knight, 1987; Parasuraman, 2000; Rosen, Sears, & Weil, 1993; Simpson & Troost, 1982), 
and the Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was 0.88 in the validation study. The current study 
found an internal consistency of 0.91. The items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
that ranged from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). An example item from this 
scale is, “I enjoy learning new computer programs and hearing about new technologies”. 
All items for this scale can be found in Appendix D. 
6.4.1.3 Technology self-efficacy  
Technology self-efficacy was measured with a 10-item scale (Holden & Rada, 
2011) that assessed participants’ “personal confidence towards successfully and 
purposefully using…technology” (p. 353).  The items were preceded with the general 
statement, “In general, I could complete any desired task using any computer/Internet 
application if…” and example statement ends are “…I had never used a technology like it 
before” and “…someone else had helped me get started”. All items were measured using a 
10-point Guttman scale that ranges from 1 (Not at all confident) to 10 (Totally confident). 




within educational settings (Klassen & Tze, 2014), and prior research has found a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.93. The current study found a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88. The full 
scale can be found in Appendix D.   
6.4.1.4 Demographics  
Participants were asked to fill out questions about their demographic information 
including items related to age, gender, job title, job tenure, work task characteristics, and 
the number of hours worked per week.  
6.4.2 Performance Episode Surveys 
6.4.2.1 Experiential features of automation 
The items that measured the experiential features of automation within the 
performance episode surveys were the same as those included in the online orientation, 
except the frame of reference was for the most recent performance episode with the 
automated software, rather than participants’ average experiences.  
6.4.2.2 Perceived intention-outcome match  
The perceived match between one’s intentions and outcomes was measured using 
three items from a larger scale that I developed and validated to assess multiple components 
of the experience of agency. There is a total of 10 items that measure perceived intention-
outcome match within the larger agency scale, and they are meant to assess the extent to 
which one’s intentions have been realized in the outcome(s) of a recent activity. The three 




higher order control factor within the multi-dimensional agency scale and were as follows: 
“I achieved my ideal outcome”, “What I wanted to happen actually happened”, and “I was 
able to achieve the results that I wanted’. These items were measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale that ranged from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The internal consistency 
of these items was α = 0.90, and the average internal consistency in this study (across all 
performance episodes) was also 0.90. 
6.4.2.3 Experience of agency  
For this study, the experience of agency was operationalized as the feeling of 
control and it was measured using three control-related items (average α = .94) taken from 
the control subscale of 10 items within the larger agency scale mentioned above. The items 
were “I felt like I was in charge”, “I felt like I was in the driver’s seat”, and “I felt like I 
was calling the shots”, measured on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The term ‘experience of agency’ and ‘experienced control’ 
will be used interchangeably in the subsequent analyses and discussion of results.  
6.4.2.4 Positive affect  
Positive affect was measured with a 9x9 square grid, called an affect grid, with two 
axes that represent the two theoretical dimensions of affect: arousal and valence (Russell, 
Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989). The arousal axis ranges from low to high activation and the 
valence axis ranges from negative to positive feelings. Sample emotions are offered in each 
different quadrant. For example, “Excited” appears in the upper right quadrant, indicating 
a positive, high activation emotion. Participants were shown the grid at each time-signaled 




The affect grid shows moderate correlations with other measures of the affective 
experience (Killgore, 1998). For the purposes of the current research, positive affect was 
operationalized using only the valence dimension of the scale, as it was thought to better 
align with previous research examining emotionally valenced outcomes in relation to the 
sense of agency (for an example, see Christensen, Yoshie, di Costa, & Haggard, 2016). An 
example of the affect grid can be found in Appendix D.  
6.4.2.5 Task characteristics  
Task characteristics were measured to determine the level of difficulty, 
enjoyableness, importance, and intrinsic interest of the tasks within participants’ 
performance episodes. Level of difficulty was assessed with the statement, “The task in 
this performance episode was interesting”, enjoyableness was assessed with the statement, 
“The task in this performance episode was enjoyable”, importance was assessed with the 
statement, “The task in this performance episode was important to my job”, and intrinsic 
interest was assessed with the statement, “The task in this performance episode was 
interesting”. Each statement was measured on a 5-point Likert scale that ranged from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).  
6.4.2.6 Authenticity   
Authenticity was assessed using a modified 3-item scale (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010) 
that measured how true participants felt that they were being to themselves in the most 
recent performance episode with the following three statements: “I was true to myself”, “I 
felt authentic in the way I acted”, and “I felt like I was really being myself”. Fleeson and 




(e.g., “I felt authentic in the way I acted during the last 20 minutes”) and reported a 7-point 
scale but did not give scale anchors. In addition to the modification of removing the 
temporal referent point, the items (average α = .92) were measured on a 5-point Likert scale 
that ranged from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).  
6.4.2.7 Work engagement  
Momentary work engagement was measured using a modified version of five items 
from the Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UES; Schaufeli, Bakker, & Salanova, 2006; 
Seppälä et al., 2009). These items are based on those reported in an ESM study that 
measured experiences of work engagement in the moment (Bledow, Schmitt, Frese, & 
Kühnel, 2011), rather than the standard trait-level conceptualization of work engagement.  
The five items captured the three dimensions of engagement, vigor, dedication, and 
absorption, and were modified to be in the past tense to reflect the participant’s most recent 
performance episode. The modified vigor items were “I felt strong and vigorous in my 
work” and “I felt bursting with energy”, the dedication items were “I was enthusiastic about 
my work” and “My work inspired me”, and the absorption item was “I was happily 
engrossed in my work”. All items (average α =.88) were measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
that ranged from 1 (Does not apply at all) to 7 (Fully applies).  
6.4.3 Exit Survey 
The exit survey included both quantitative and qualitative items. The quantitative 
item assessed participants’ average level of awareness of the automated business software 
in their jobs across the three performance episodes they reported, on a scale from 1 (Not at 




(1-3 sentences) about their experiences participating in the study and their thoughts on what 
the study intended to measure. There was also  space for participants to list any questions 
or concerns they had about the study, as well as space for them to provide their mailing 
addresses to receive their compensation for the study.  
 Data Analytic Strategy 
Given the aim of aggregating the momentary-level responses to the person-level 
for analysis, I first computed rwg indices of the performance episode measures to determine 
the consistency of participants’ responses across the three performance episode surveys 
(James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984). The rwg values were calculated to indicate if the 
aggregation of the within-person observations was warranted, with higher consistency 
between the responses indicating a stronger between-person than within-person trend in 
the data. A rule of thumb for rwg values is that it is appropriate to aggregate lower level 
responses to a higher level if the mean rwg value equals or exceeds .70 (Klein & Kozlowski, 
2009). The rwg indices can be found in Table 1 below. There was high within-person 
consistency on most of the recurrent measures, save for positive affect (rwg = .56) and some 
of the task characteristics (rwg range = .64 - .83), which is not unexpected. However, given 
that most of the measures were well above acceptable limits, I felt that it was warranted to 
aggregate the performance episode measures to the person-level. I will describe the 
aggregation method here before turning to the hypotheses.  
For the experiential features of automation, I felt that it was most appropriate to 
retain the ratings gathered in the orientation, in addition to the ratings gathered during the 




for this study assumed that the experiential features of automation would be relatively 
stable during the study period, which was the impetus for including the measures in the 
orientation. Second, this method also accounted for momentary changes in the experiential 
features of automation (e.g., the software crashes for the first time), which may have 
introduced noise into the relationship with the experience of agency that would be 
unaccounted for if only the orientation ratings of experiential features of automation were 
used in analyses. Additionally, the correlations between the orientation measures and 
performance episode survey measures for each experiential feature of automation were 
significantly correlated at p < .001, which provided additional justification for the 
aggregation (See Table 2 below). Therefore, I averaged the orientation and performance 
episode surveys together, each with equal weights for the subsequent analyses for the 
experiential features of automation. 
The remaining performance episode measures were not collected during the 
orientation, so those were all aggregated by averaging the performance episode ratings to 
create person-level scores. To address the lower-than-acceptable rwg values for the positive 
affect and task characteristic measures, I utilized both single level and multilevel regression 
analyses among relevant formal hypotheses and exploratory analyses to account for the 
higher levels of within-person variability within those measures. All multilevel analyses 
indicated stronger between-person than within-person trends in the data, which, in 
combination with the generally high rwg values, provided sufficient justification for the 





Table 1 – Rwg Values of Performance Episode Measures 
Variable rwg 
Experiential Features of Automation  
Perceived Level of Automation 0.84 
Perceived Ease of Use 0.91 
Perceived Usefulness 0.92 




Perceived Intention-Outcome Match 0.79 
Experienced Control 0.82 
Proximal Well-Being Outcomes  
Positive Affect 0.56 
Authenticity 0.85 
Work Engagement 0.87 
Task/Technology Characteristics  
Task Difficulty 0.64 
Task Interestingness 0.66 
Task Enjoyability 0.68 
Task Importance 0.83 






Table 2 – Correlations between Orientation and Performance Episode Measures of Experiential Features of Automation 
  LoA Orient PEU Orient PU Orient Rel Orient ExpSkill Orient 
LoA PE 1 0.651***     
LoA PE 2 0.605***     
LoA PE 3 0.619***     
PEU PE 1  0.599***    
PEU PE 2  0.439***    
PEU PE 3  0.510***    
PU PE 1   0.816***   
PU PE 2   0.639***   
PU PE 3   0.814***   
Rel PE 1    0.715***  
Rel PE 2    0.662***  
Rel PE 3    0.608***  
ExpSkill PE 1     0.726*** 
ExpSkill PE 2     0.638*** 




Note. *** indicates p < .001; ‘Orient’ = collected during the orientation; ‘PE 1’, ‘PE 2’ and ‘PE 3’ = collected across the three performance 
episode surveys. ‘LoA’ = Perceived Level of Automation; ‘PEU’ = Perceived Ease of Use; ‘PU’ = Perceived Usefulness; ‘Rel’ = ‘Perceived 









CHAPTER 7. RESULTS 
I collected a total of 251 responses from 81 participants from the performance 
episode surveys. It is important to note that about halfway through data collection, I 
realized that I had made an error in setting up the performance episode surveys in Qualtrics. 
Instead of receiving all six blocks of survey items (experiential features of automation, 
agency, affect grid, authenticity, work engagement, and task characteristics) in each 
performance episode survey, participants had only received a random set of five out of the 
total six blocks of survey items. This issue resulted in a random set of missing data for the 
participants who responded to the performance episode survey before I corrected the error, 
which affected 29% of the total observations. However, given the random nature of the 
missing survey blocks, I determined that this data was missing completely at random 
(MCAR). MCAR is arguably the ‘best’ type of missing data, as it does not present any 
theoretical bias.  
I conducted follow-up analyses to examine whether there were any statistical 
differences between the responses collected from the performance episode survey before 
and after I corrected the error. I conducted multilevel linear regressions to examine whether 
a dummy-coded variable, that indicated whether the response was collected from the 
survey before or after the error was corrected, predicted any of the survey variables of 
interest. None of those analyses were significant. I examined whether any of the survey 
variables of interest were significantly correlated with the dummy-code, and none were. 
Finally, I performed multilevel logistic regressions to examine whether the dummy-coded 




those analyses were significant. Given the MCAR nature of the data and the non-
significance of the follow-up analyses, I did not choose to omit the affected responses nor 
to perform any imputation methods on the missing observations. Thus, although the error 
in the survey decreased the study’s power by reducing the number of total observations, it 
did not pose a threat to the external validity of the study.  
I examined the performance episode survey data to screen for duplicate responses 
using the timestamps of the surveys and the episode descriptions to remove any responses 
that occurred on the same day for the same tasks, which led me to discard 6 responses. 
Some participants provided more than three performance episode survey responses, but the 
additional responses were retained for analysis if they did not occur within 30 minutes of 
other responses and did not have the same episode description. I retained a total of 248 
performance episode survey responses. I aggregated the responses to the person-level for 
subsequent analysis, which resulted in a total of 81 unique person-level responses for each 
of the path model variables, including the data gathered from the online orientation. The 
descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables to be included in the path model 
variables can be found in Tables 2 and 3.  
I screened the data for normality and outliers by examining the descriptive statistics 
and Q-Q plots for the path model variables. The data generally displayed a negative skew, 
such that responses were more positive than would be expected under a normal distribution. 
Variables that were negatively skewed outside of the normal range of -1 to 1 included 
perceived usefulness (-2.14), perceived reliability (-1.20), and perceived intention-outcome 
match (-1.09), and age was positively skewed (1.23).  Additionally, perceived usefulness 




distribution indicated that many of the responses fell in the same area on the high end of 
the scale (i.e., most participants rated the software in their jobs as highly useful at every 
measurement). In the Results section, I describe the additional precautions taken with 
perceived usefulness as a dependent variable within the preliminary regression tests due to 
the likelihood of non-normally distributed residuals.  
 To test the hypotheses, I conducted a path analysis to simultaneously test the 
proposed relationships. Before doing so, I also conducted three sets of preliminary 
regressions to get a sense of the relationships to aid model fitting. I took additional 
precautions with the regressions involving perceived usefulness and those methods will be 
described where appropriate. In this section, I first discuss these three sets of analyses, 
which have been segmented based on the three major sets of hypotheses. Finally, I describe 
the path models, including the originally proposed model and the refitted model based on 




Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics for Path Model Variables 
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
N  
Obs 
Affinity for Technology 4.11 0.70 4.2 2.3 5 -0.75 -0.14 81 
Age 33.69 9.66 30 22 63 1.23 0.83 81 
Technology Self-Efficacy 8.05 1.23 8.2 4.9 10 -0.40 -0.66 81 
Perceived LoA 5.01 2.11 5 1 10 0.01 -0.8 81 
Perceived Ease of Use 5.64 0.81 5.62 2.75 6.92 -0.60 0.66 81 
Perceived Usefulness 6.18 0.97 6.56 1.19 7 -2.14 6.98 81 
Perceived Reliability 5.84 0.91 5.89 2.33 7 -1.20 2.26 81 
Experience/Skill 4.07 0.65 4.12 2 5 -0.57 -0.12 81 
Perceived I-O Match 4.41 0.56 4.56 2.17 5 -1.09 1.68 81 
Experienced Control 4.23 0.70 4.33 2.11 5 -0.76 -0.06 81 
Positive Affect 1.05 1.52 1.33 -3.33 4 -0.64 0.24 81 
Authenticity 4.31 0.68 4.56 3 5 -0.54 -1.11 81 
Work Engagement 4.45 1.08 4.33 2.22 7 0.03 -0.44 81 
Task Interestingness 3.29 0.91 3.33 1 5 -0.19 -0.65 81 
Task Enjoyability 3.17 0.82 3 1 5 -0.15 0.22 81 
Task Importance 4.51 0.54 4.67 2.5 5 -1.11 1.19 81 
Task Difficulty 2.33 0.93 2.33 1 5 0.50 -0.15 81 
 
Note. Values represent person-level averages for orientation responses and performance episode survey responses that have 
been averaged to the person-level. The experiential features of automation variables represent person-level orientation and 






Table 4 – Correlations of Path Model Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Affinity for Technology             
2. Age -.04            
3. Technology Self-
Efficacy 
.60** -.08           
4. Perceived Level of 
Automation 
.31** -.08 .24*          
5. Perceived Ease of Use .05 .11 .04 .06         
6. Perceived Usefulness .15 -.09 .21 .27* .42**        
7. Perceived Reliability .14 .08 .15 .23* .66** .59**       
8. Experience/Skill .08 .23* .09 .07 .50** .26* .23*      
9. Perceived Intention-
Outcome Match 
.07 .18 .11 -.06 .47** .38** .51** .35**     
10. Experienced Control .15 .17 .02 -.03 .43** .37** .42** .30** .45**    
11. Positive Affect .08 .25* .15 .07 .04 .04 .06 -.10 -.03 .17   
12. Authenticity .03 .31** .06 .09 .21 .25* .08 .20 .31** .32** .14  
13. Work Engagement .24* .39** .27* .28* .24* .21 .27* .13 .13 .30** .45** .40** 
 





 The Impact of Automation on Agency 
The primary goal of this investigation was to examine whether there were shared 
experiential features of automation across different types of automated business software 
that were related to individuals’ experiences of agency while working with the software. I 
suggested that the various experiential features of automation would be related to the 
experience of control and that those relationships would be mediated by perceived 
intention-outcome match, which was proposed to be the mechanism of the experience of 
agency. To preliminarily test the direct relationships, I conducted separate linear 
regressions between the different experiential features and the experience of agency, and I 
tested the mediated relationships by computing confidence intervals (CIs) for the indirect 
effects using the RMediation package (Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011). The RMediation 
package computes CIs for indirect effects by calculating the distribution of the product of 
the a and b path coefficients from the mediated model.  
In Hypotheses 1a and 1b, I proposed that there would be a negative direct 
relationship between the perceived level of automation and the experience of agency and 
an indirect relationship between those variables through perceived intention-outcome 
match. I did not find support for either the direct effect, b = -.01, p = .81 nor the indirect 
effect, ab = -.01, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.02]. The remainder of the main hypotheses (2a-5b) 
proposed positive direct relationships between the experiential features of automation 
(perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, perceived reliability, experience/skill) and the 
experience of agency, as well as the mediation of those relationships by perceived 
intention-outcome match. I found support for each of these hypotheses, and the coefficients 




Perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, perceived reliability, and experience/skill were 
all positively related to experienced control and those relationships were all mediated by 
perceived intention-outcome match. Thus, Hypotheses 2a-2b were supported. Although I 
conducted each of these regression analyses separately, the significant direct effects 
remained significant after controlling for Type I error using the Holm-Bonferroni method. 
P-values cannot be computed for the indirect effects using the product of coefficients 
method, which prevented a similar test of the family-wise error rate for the indirect effects. 










-0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 – 0.19 -0.25 – 0.19 0.815 
Perceived Ease 
of Use 
0.37 0.09 0.43 0.20 – 0.55 0.23 – 0.63 <0.001 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
0.26 0.08 0.37 0.12 – 0.41 0.16 – 0.57 0.001 
Perceived 
Reliability 
0.32 0.08 0.42 0.16 – 0.47 0.22 – 0.62 <0.001 






Table 6 – Indirect Effects of Experiential Features of Automation on Experienced 
Control through Perceived Intention-Outcome Match 
Independent  
Variables 
Indirect Effect 95% CI 
Estimate SE LL UL 
Perceived Level of 
Automation 
-0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.02 
Perceived Ease of 
Use 
0.13 0.05 0.04 0.24 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
0.10 0.04 0.03 0.19 
Perceived 
Reliability 
0.12 0.05 0.03 0.23 
Experience/Skill 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.28 
Note. The indirect effects reflect the product of the a and b path coefficients within the 
mediated relationships, based on the distribution of the product method introduced by 
MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002). I calculated these effects 
using the RMediation package (Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011), which provides information 
about the effects’ significance with CIs, rather than p values. 
 Traits and Task Characteristics 
To test Hypotheses 6a – 8c, I conducted three sets of multivariate regressions to 
examine the impact of the three individual difference variables (affinity for technology, 
age, and technology self-efficacy) on the various experiential features of automation. I 
followed up tests involving perceived usefulness as a dependent variable with separate 
robust regression tests because of the non-normal distribution of this variable. Hypotheses 
6a-c proposed that affinity for technology would be positively related to (a) perceived ease 
of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability. Hypotheses 6a and 6c were 
not supported, but Hypothesis 6b was supported, b = .26, p = .02, such that affinity for 




Hypotheses 7a-c proposed that age would be negatively related to (a) perceived 
ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, and (c) perceived reliability, and none of these 
hypotheses were supported. Coefficients ranged from -.009 to .009 and p-values ranged 
from .32 to .48. Hypotheses 8a-c proposed that technology self-efficacy would be 
positively related to (a) perceived ease of use, (b) perceived usefulness, (c) experience/skill. 
Hypotheses 8a and 8c were non-significant, but the relationship between technology self-
efficacy and perceived usefulness was significant in the expected, positive direction, b = 
.18, p = .005. I conducted some exploratory analyses on the relationships between the 
individual differences and experiential features of automation that were not explicitly 
predicted, and these results, as well as those mentioned above, can be found in Table 6. 
There were some unexpected significant relationships among the exploratory analyses, 
including a positive relationship between affinity for technology and perceived level of 
automation, b = 0.92, p = .005, age and experience/skill, b = .02, p = .04, and technology 
self-efficacy and perceived level of automation, b = 0.41, p = .03.  
Although not formally hypothesized, it was an exploratory aim of this study to 
examine the effects of task characteristics on the relationships between the experiential 
features of automation and agency. The rwg values of the task characteristic measures did 
not meet the recommended .70 cutoff (See Table 1), so I first explored the relationships 
between the task characteristics, perceived intention-outcome match, and experienced 
control within multilevel analyses to see if there were effects at the within-person or 
between-person levels. I found that, among all the task characteristics, effects were being 
driven at the between-person level, so I proceeded with the following analyses with data 




Table 7 – Multivariate Regressions for Experiential Features of Automation by Individual Difference Predictors 
 
Perceived Level of 
Automation 
Perceived Ease of Use Perceived Usefulness1 Perceived Reliability Experience/Skill 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Affinity for 
Technology 
0.92 0.32 0.31** 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.25 0.10 0.19* 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.08 
Age -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.23* 
Technology 
Self-Efficacy 
0.41 0.19 0.24* 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.18** 0.09 0.23** 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.09 
Note. *p < 0.5; ** p < .001. 1The unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and standardized coefficients for the analyses in which 
Perceived Usefulness is a predictor are extracted from robust regression analyses due to the non-normality of perceived usefulness. All 






The task characteristics that I examined included task difficulty, task 
interestingness, task enjoyability, and task importance. Because these were exploratory 
analyses, I only discuss the significant results with a specific focus on the interaction terms 
between the experiential features of automation and the task characteristics on experienced 
control. For task difficulty, I found a significant interaction term between task difficulty 
and level of automation, b = .11, p = .004, such that high levels of perceived level of 
automation were related to reduced levels of experienced control when coupled with easy 
tasks and high levels of experienced control when coupled with difficult tasks (See Figure 
1). To further explore this interaction, I conducted a mediated moderation model to 
examine whether perceived intention-outcome match mediated the interaction effects of 
perceived level of automation and task difficulty on experienced control. The mediated 
moderation was not significant, ab = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.065].  
There was a significant interaction between task interestingness and perceived ease 
of use, b = -0.19, p = 0.028, such that at low levels of perceived ease of use (difficult-to-
use software), experienced control was higher when coupled with interesting tasks than 
with non-interesting tasks, yet task interestingness did not seem to play a role in 
experienced control at high levels of perceived ease of use (See Figure 2). There were also 
significant interactions between task enjoyability and perceived ease of use, b = -0.19, p = 
0.010, perceived usefulness, b = -.23, p < 0.001, and experience/skill, b = -0.23, p = 0.016. 
For each of these unique experiential features of automation, the effect of task enjoyability 
was similar: at low levels of perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, or 




with unenjoyable tasks, but the effects of task enjoyability faded at high levels of those 
experiential features (See Figures 3 – 6). 
 







Figure 3 – Interaction between Perceived Ease of Use and Task Interestingness on 
Experienced Control 
 






Figure 5 – Interaction between Perceived Usefulness and Task Enjoyability on 
Experienced Control 
 





 Well-Being Outcomes 
For the final set of preliminary analyses, I conducted simple linear regressions to 
examine the relationships between the experience of agency and positive affect (H9), 
authenticity (H10), and work engagement (H11a). For Hypothesis 9, I expected a positive 
relationship between the experience of agency and positive affect, but this relationship was 
not significant, b = 0.36, p = .14. For hypotheses 10 and 11, I expected positive 
relationships between the experience of agency and authenticity and work engagement, and 
found significant relationships for both authenticity, b = 0.32, p = 0.003, and work 
engagement, b = 0.47, p = 0.006. Therefore, Hypothesis 9 was not supported but 
Hypotheses 10 and 11 were.  
 Path Model 
To conduct the path analysis, I first tested the proposed path model that included 
all hypothesized relationships, and then I modified the fit based on the results of the 
preliminary analyses. As expected, the original path model exhibited poor fit, χ2(46) = 
183.81, CFI = 0.40, RMSEA = 0.19, SRMR = 0.18. To improve model fit, I removed the 
paths that were non-significant in the preliminary analyses, which essentially involved 
removing all paths related to the individual difference variables (affinity for technology, 
age, technology self-efficacy), perceived level of automation, and positive affect. I initially 
included the significant paths from affinity for technology and technology self-efficacy to 
perceived usefulness, but the model still exhibited poor fit with these paths included. 
Although structural equation modeling (SEM) does not require normally distributed data, 




regressions for these relationships should be considered with caution. After those paths 
were removed, the modified path model exhibited acceptable fit, χ2(10) = 16.49, CFI = 
0.92, RMSEA = 0.09, SRMR = 0.06. The modified path model is shown in Figure 7. 
 





CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the current research was to examine the relationship between 
automated technologies and workers’ experiences of agency. I also examined several 
individual difference variables as potential trait-like predictors of individuals’ experiences 
with automation and boundary conditions of the relationships between the features of 
automation and agency in the form of task characteristics. Finally, I explored the 
relationships between experiences of agency and proximal well-being outcomes to assess 
whether agency is related to aspects of well-being at work. In this section, I discuss the 
results of each of these three aims in the context of the broader literature. I also provide 
theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and future directions for research on 
these topics.  
 The Impact of Automation on Agency 
The primary propositions within the current research related to the experiential 
impact of automation on workers’ sense of agency. First, I suggested that there are shared 
experiential features of automation that can be meaningfully examined across different 
automated technologies. I suggested that these experiential features influence individuals’ 
experiences of agency while working with automated technologies by impacting the 
mechanism of agency, which was conceptualized as the perceived match between one’s 
intentions and outcomes for work-related activities. Overall, there was strong support for 
these propositions, such that five out of the six experiential features of automation were 
directly related to the experience of agency (experienced control), and those relationships 




use, perceived usefulness, and perceived reliability of an automated technology, as well as 
one’s experience and skill working with the automated technology, were all found to be 
significant predictors of one’s experience of agency within work activities coupled with 
the technology.  
Although I did not find support for the direct or indirect relationship between 
perceived level of automation and the experience of agency, exploratory analyses revealed 
a significant interaction effect between level of automation and task difficulty on the 
experience of agency. Under low levels of task difficulty, the relationship between the 
perceived level of automation and the experience of agency was negative, in the 
hypothesized direction, such that high levels of automation were related to low levels of 
experienced control. However, the relationship between perceived level of automation and 
the experience of agency was in the opposite direction under high levels of task difficulty, 
such that high levels of automation were related to high levels of experienced control. Past 
research has examined the influence of task difficulty on the sense of agency, although 
those findings have shown a negative effect, such that task difficulty decreased the sense 
of agency (Howard, Edwards, & Bayliss, 2016; Sidarus & Haggard, 2016). I found no main 
effect of task difficulty on experienced control in the current study. Although I am not 
aware of any existing research that has examined the moderating role of task difficulty on 
the relationship between the perceived level of automation and agency, I will offer a 
potential explanation of the results. 
In the context of difficult tasks, individuals may experience high automation as an 
enhancement to control because they are able to accomplish more than what they would be 




may experience diminished control because they do not have the resources available to 
meet the demands of the task. For example, I would feel a much greater sense of control 
conducting linear regressions in R than if I were to try to do so with a calculator. With R 
(high automation), the software handles the complex statistics, and I only need to provide 
the correct code. I feel a high sense of control in this scenario because with R I can quickly 
and easily obtain the results I need, and I trust that those results are accurate, which is not 
something I would experience without the use of such software. With a calculator (low 
automation), I am responsible for setting up the appropriate equations to achieve the correct 
answer, which might make me feel less confident over the results, thereby reducing my 
feelings of control over the task. These findings may relate to the well-established 
curvilinear relationship between personal ability and strain within person-environment fit 
theory (French, Caplan, & Van Harrison, 1982). For example, the scenario with the 
calculator may represent high strain (and low control) because the demands of the task 
exceed my personal ability, whereas the scenario with R represents low strain (and high 
control) because I have enough resources to meet the demands of the task.  
The effects of the perceived level of automation on the experience of agency are 
different in the context of easy tasks. Individuals may experience high levels of agency 
while working on easy tasks with low automated technologies because they are more 
confident about their abilities to accomplish the task: they have enough resources to meet 
the demands of the task and the low automated technology is merely serving as an aid. 
However, I suggest that there is a unique experiential shift when individuals are working 
with high automated technologies on easy tasks. In this scenario, I suggest that the joint 




individuals to form weaker intentions around the task (i.e., become less invested) which 
causes their experiences of control to suffer. This interpretation is in line with Obhi and 
Hall’s (2012) interpretation, relating to the OOL performance problem. When high 
automated technologies are primarily responsible for the components of a given activity, 
individuals may become less invested in the task (i.e., OOL) and experience lower feelings 
of control in relation to the task’s outcomes. I would argue that the current findings also 
suggest that individuals are becoming disinvested from the task and experiencing decreased 
agency because the task is perceived as being ‘easy’ because it is primarily managed by 
the technology. 
In addition to the moderating effect of task difficulty on the relationship between 
perceived level of automation and experienced control, there were several other interaction 
effects between task characteristics and experiential features of automation on the 
experience of control. Task interestingness moderated the relationship between perceived 
ease of use and experienced control such that at low levels of perceived ease of use, 
interesting tasks were related to higher experienced control than were non-interesting tasks, 
but task interestingness did not influence experienced control at high levels of perceived 
ease of use. I found similar results for interactions between task enjoyability and perceived 
ease of use, usefulness, and experience skill, such that enjoyable tasks were related to high 
agency under low levels of those experiential features but the effect of task enjoyability 
was diminished at high levels of the experiential features. These preliminary results seem 
to suggest that the nature of the task might have a greater impact on individuals’ experience 




However, these results were based on exploratory analyses, so further research is needed 
on these relationships before such conclusions can be made.   
 The Roles of Individual Differences 
While the hypotheses regarding the relationships between the experiential features 
of automation and agency were largely supported, those that focused on the individual 
difference predictors were largely non-significant. Although there was some indication that 
affinity for technology and technology self-efficacy were significantly related to perceived 
usefulness using robust regression analyses, these results were not supported by the path 
analysis. Although there is relatively little research about these traits in relation to 
perceptions of technology, the current findings are contrary to past evidence. I will first 
address the lack of findings for the affinity for technology and technology self-efficacy 
variables before turning to a discussion of the role of age and the role of individual 
differences in experiences of technology more generally.  
Participants provided their ratings for affinity for technology and technology self-
efficacy based on their attitudes towards technology and their abilities with technology 
generally, rather than with the specific automated business software they used in the study. 
Although the relationships between these two variables and the experiential features of 
automation would have almost certainly been stronger if the referent point of the scales 
had been the automated business software versus technology generally (Karsten et al., 
2012), I intentionally kept the referent point of the items to technology in general. For these 
hypotheses, I really wanted to know whether there were trait-like constructs, such as 




individuals’ experiences of automation. Data that affirmed this question would have then 
allowed me to generalize my findings more broadly to say something like, “People who 
are more efficacious with technology or positively view technology will generally have a 
better experience with automated technology in their jobs”. However, no such claims can 
be made considering the current data. Future research in this area may benefit from 
including more specific trait constructs (e.g., self-efficacy with the software of interest) to 
gain a better understanding of whether these predictors could be meaningful at a narrower 
level of conceptualization.   
The non-significant effects of age on the experiential features of automation could 
have several causes. An initial concern was a lack of variance in participants’ ages, with 
the belief that most workers who self-selected into the study were younger due to the 
automated business software requirement. There was a wide range of ages among 
participants in the study sample (22 – 63 years old), so the variance in age was likely not a 
reason for the lack of effects. However, there may have still been a self-selection problem 
with study sample, such that the older participants who participated in this study were not 
representative of older adults generally, in terms of their attitudes towards technology. 
Participants who completed this study were required to signal interest in the study and 
understanding of the term ‘automated business software’, use an automated business 
software in their jobs, and complete all portions of the study online through either a 
computer or mobile device. These selection barriers may have precluded the inclusion of 
older adults who have less positive attitudes towards technology and who would have 




Moreover, past research on the topic of age and technology has generally focused 
on older adults’ negative perceptions of technology, wherein older adults represent 
individuals above the age of 65 (Czaja et al., 2006; Mitzner et al., 2010; Olson, O’Brien, 
Rogers, & Charness, 2011; Xie, Watkins, Golbeck, & Huang, 2012).  It is possible that a 
generational effect, rather than a linear age effect, is a more appropriate way to examine 
age differences in perceptions of technology. Furthermore, it is likely that younger 
generations (i.e., Generation X, Millennials, and Gen Z) display more similar perceptions 
of technology than do older adults because of the development and rise of digital 
technologies in the 1990s and 2000s. Older adults fall into the Baby Boomer generation 
(those born between  1946 – 1964), although I only had five people in the current study 
that would have qualified for inclusion in such a category. Thus, it was not possible to 
examine meaningful generational differences in the current study, although it remains an 
interesting question for future research to explore. 
Beyond the limitations already mentioned, it is possible that the lack of findings 
noted here highlights a broader conceptual issue regarding the momentary nature of 
experiences of technology. Participants were asked to provide their ratings of the various 
experiential features of automation regarding their experiences both generally, during the 
orientation, and within the moment, during the performance episode surveys. These 
referent points invite participants to think about how they feel while they are using the 
specific software in their jobs, which may be a unique experience from how they may use 
another technology in their lives (e.g., their cell phones). In other words, it may be the case 
that experiences with different technologies are not well-predicted by broad individual 




by the experiential features of the technologies themselves. As I stated earlier, it is likely 
that more specific constructs to certain technologies (e.g., technology self-efficacy with 
technology X) would provide more information, which may be a useful starting point to 
better understand these relationships. Future research on this topic should include these and 
other trait-like constructs to gather more information about the viability of individual 
differences as predictors of experiences with technologies.  
 Well-Being Outcomes 
The last set of hypotheses focused on the relationships between agency and the 
proximal well-being outcomes of positive affect, authenticity, and work engagement. It 
was expected that the experience of agency would be positively related to positive affect, 
which was measured as valence, but this relationship was not significant. The within-
person variance of valence was much higher than that of experienced control, which 
suggests that there were contextual factors that contributed to participants’ momentary 
levels of positive affect that were not accounted for in the current study. This is not 
unexpected – it is well established that emotional states are transient  (Ashkanasy & 
Humphrey, 2011) and that events at work can cause substantial emotion shifts (Weiss & 
Cropanzano, 1996). Given prior research, it was expected that a significant portion of this 
transience could be predicted by momentary experiences of agency (Christensen, Yoshie, 
Di Costa, & Haggard, 2016; Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013, 2017), 
however, these studies were all conducted in laboratory settings and with slightly different 
designs. Specifically, these studies manipulated the affective valence of the outcomes of 
participants’ actions, rather than eliciting emotional reports following agentic or non-




it is an open question whether the opposite is true. It was not possible to test directional 
effects in the current study, but future research should examine the nature of this 
relationship more closely.  
I expected that the experience of agency would be positively related to authenticity 
and work engagement and found support for both of those hypotheses: higher experienced 
control was related to higher feelings of authenticity and higher feelings of work 
engagement. Agency and authenticity are conceptually quite similar, in that agency can be 
understood as the experience of doing what one wanted or intended to do, whereas 
authenticity can be understood as the feeling that one has been true to oneself, which should 
naturally include the achievement of intentions (e.g., I said I was going to do this and I 
did). These results suggest that momentary experiences of agency contribute to momentary 
experiences of authenticity, which may accumulate to form individuals’ attributions of 
themselves as authentic or inauthentic persons (Kraus, Chen, & Keltner, 2011). Future 
research should examine whether momentary experiences of agency over time are related 
to more stable self-concepts related to authenticity.  
In a similar vein, these findings suggest that momentary experiences of control in 
one’s work are related to momentary feelings of work engagement, yet agency may also 
be an important window to understanding more stable levels of work engagement. The 
positive relationship between trait-level measurements of job control and work engagement 
has been established (Mauno et al., 2007; Swanberg, McKechnie, Ojha, & James, 2011), 
but this relationship can be examined in a more temporally precise manner through 
constructs like agency and momentary engagement. Just as momentary healthy behaviors 




momentary experiences of high and low agency at work likely contribute to individuals’ 
more positive stable attributions and workplace attitudes. Future research should examine 
the question of whether momentary experiences of high agency contribute to feelings of 
work engagement over time, as well as if decreased experiences of agency can lead to the 
manifestation of job burnout.   
 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
There are two major contributions of the current research that have related 
theoretical and practical implications, so I will discuss them jointly here. The first is that 
this investigation represents a novel attempt at understanding the role that automation 
serves in the daily experiences of the modern workforce. Much of the past research on 
technology in the workplace has focused on how the introduction of new technologies 
changes existing paradigms in different areas like recruitment, selection, and teams. For 
example, researchers have been interested in how new sources of online information from 
social media can be used to attract new candidates (Davison, Maraist, & Bing, 2011), how 
mobile assessments of test batteries affect their predictive validity (Illingworth, Morelli, 
Scott, & Boyd, 2015), and how virtual teams communicate and coordinate with each other 
(Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2007). Taken together, these research streams all work towards 
optimizing organizational performance by accounting for the new contexts that technology 
affords. The current study expands on the existing literature by underscoring the impact of 
technology on the individual worker, rather than on organizational outcomes.  
This new orientation towards the understanding the psychological impact of 




changes have real implications for the average worker. Researchers at McKinsey Global 
Institute published a report in 2018 on the future of work with several important insights 
(Manyika & Sneader, 2018). One was that work is changing – automation is not only 
creating or eliminating jobs, but it is also transforming them: “At retailer Amazon, 
employees who previously lifted and stacked objects are becoming robot operators, 
monitoring the automated arms and resolving issues such as interruption in the flow of 
objects”. Another insight was that automation is changing both workplaces and workflows: 
“As self-checkout machines are introduced in stores, for example, cashiers can become 
checkout assistance helpers, who can help answer questions or troubleshoot the machines”. 
These kinds of work role changes have major implications for the kinds of skills and 
abilities that are needed for future jobs, but there are also implications for how work 
alongside automation will be experienced. How will work with automation affect workers’ 
basic experiences of motivation and work engagement? How will individuals’ sense of 
work identity change? These research questions were not included in the present 
investigation, but it is my hope that this project has instigated these types of considerations 
because of its focus on the impact of technology on the worker, rather than on 
organizations’ bottom lines. 
The second major contribution is the study of agency in a workplace context. Past 
research on agency has examined how the sense of agency emerges from individuals’ 
specific psychomotor actions, such as moving a hand or clicking a mouse and how the 
sense of agency might be altered by manipulating individuals’ perceptions of their own 
actions (Aarts et al., 2005; Engbert et al., 2008; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wohlschläger 




volition arise in relation to our actions, particularly in the context of disorders of volition 
(e.g., schizophrenia), although it is not obviously impactful to research on  the psychology 
of work. However, in this study, I have attempted to demonstrate how the extrapolation of 
the sense of agency from lower level psychomotor phenomena to the level of performance 
episodes at work provides a meaningful way to understand how individuals experience 
control in their daily work activities. Extant research on control in I-O and OB literatures 
has conceptualized control constructs as relatively stable, with constructs like locus of 
control and self-efficacy as major examples. Research on these topics has greatly aided the 
understanding of how individuals’ orientations towards control affect long-term outcomes 
like mental and physical health, but they do not provide a clear picture on what the daily 
experiences of those phenomena are like.  
Likewise, work specific control constructs such as job autonomy have also been 
conceptualized as being relatively stable across time and have largely addressed the amount 
of control offered in the organizational environment rather than the amount of experienced 
control on behalf of the worker. For example, job autonomy can be broken down into 
subscales of work scheduling autonomy, (e.g., “The job allows me to make my own 
decisions about how to schedule my work”), decision-making autonomy, (e.g., “The job 
gives me a chance to use my personal initiative or judgment in carrying out the work”), 
and work methods autonomy, (e.g., “The job allows me to make decisions about what 
methods I use to complete my work.”). These features reflect the amount of control 
available in the job itself, rather than an individual’s actual experience of control in his or 
her daily work activities. The construct of agency is unique to existing control constructs 




allows for a more precise investigation of how control and accompanying experiential 
states unfold across time in one’s work.  
 In addition to the novelty of this construct to organizational research, the current 
research has provided preliminary evidence of the relationship between agency and 
important workplace outcomes, like authenticity and work engagement. Although there is 
not a large literature on authenticity in the workplace, research that has been done shows 
that authenticity is positively related to outcomes like work engagement and job 
performance (van den Bosch & Taris, 2014). Work engagement has been a hot topic for 
the past decade, particularly for organizations that seek to increase employee engagement 
with the goal of improving organizational performance. The current research has 
demonstrated that increasing workers’ experiences of agency may be a way to achieve 
higher feelings of authenticity and work engagement, which could also have positive 
benefits on performance outcomes. Moreover, given the temporal precision afforded by the 
measurement of agency at the performance episode level, it will be possible in future 
research to examine how experiences of control (or lack thereof) may accumulate over time 
to affect outcomes like engagement and performance.   
 Limitations  
This study had several limitations. First, the implications that can be made 
regarding the effects of automation on agency at work are limited because the study was 
not able to examine individuals’ experiences of agency with and without automated 
technologies in place. The current study examined the relationships between the 




allowed for an understanding of how different experiences of automation may relate to 
different experiences of agency. However, this research design did not permit an 
examination of how experiences of agency within work might change with the introduction 
of automated technologies versus the same work that does not involve automation. The 
comparison of similar work tasks, with and without automation, would allow for stronger 
claims regarding the impact of automation on agency, although this type of research design 
would be difficult to achieve outside of an experimental setting.  
In this study, I felt it was more important and meaningful to illuminate the role of 
automation as it exists in individuals’ work lives, rather than provide an isolated test of 
those relationships that might not be generalizable. The use of automation is already 
prevalent across many different work settings, as can be noted from the variety of software 
and job types included in this relatively small study. Thus, it was really my goal to 
understand how individuals’ work experiences are already adapting to fit the automation 
in place, rather than understanding how individuals’ experiences might change if 
automation is introduced. However, this is not to say that the latter question is unimportant. 
It remains an extremely important question that was beyond the scope of this study. Future 
research would benefit from exploring how specific tasks and roles change, in terms of 
experiences, as well as productivity and performance, in reaction to the introduction of 
automated technologies.  
Second, it is possible that the automated software included in the current study were 
not wholly reflective of the types of automation described in this paper’s introduction. I 
built the study’s theoretical framework and hypotheses with the notion that automation can 




represented by some of the automated business software used by participants in this study. 
For example, there were many types of data management software used by participants in 
this study, and participants reported work tasks such as ‘pulling information’ and 
‘generating reports’ with those technologies. It is not clear that the experiences of these 
kinds of tasks are qualitatively different with the use of the automated software noted by 
participants than if they were using any other less-automated technology. In other words, 
some of the software and tasks reported by participants seemed to reflect the experience of 
the software as a tool, rather than as a highly automated technology partner with which the 
task was shared. This issue could also be a reason for the lack of findings for a main effect 
between perceived level of automation and agency in the current study. 
Although the inclusion of a diverse array of automated software was an important 
starting point for the current study because it was representative of the types of automation 
that many workers are currently using, future research would benefit from using a more 
precise operationalization of automation. Specifically, future research could employ an 
experimental design to manipulate the level of automation such that participants are 
exposed to high ‘partnership’ levels of automation, as well as low ‘assistance-only’ levels 
of automation to more explicitly understand whether there is unique experiential influence 
of high automation on agency beyond lower forms of automation. Additionally, such a 
design could include perceptions of level of automation, like those measured in this study, 
to examine how closely perceived and objective levels of automation align. This design 
could also include a manipulation of task difficulty, to provide an a priori test of the 
significant interaction found between perceived level of automation and task difficulty in 




Third, the relationships examined in this study were based entirely on self-report 
data, and it is well-established that such an approach has several potential weaknesses. The 
collection of all this study’s data through the same method (i.e., self-report) raises the 
possibility of common method variance between the constructs of interest (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959). Common method variance refers to variance that is attributable to a shared 
measurement method rather than to the true relationships between the constructs of interest. 
Thus, it is possible that by collecting the experiential features of automation and 
experiences of agency through self-report, the relationships between these variables are 
artificially inflated because of the shared measurement method. Although I attempted to 
overcome this issue by providing temporal separation between the measurement of the 
experiential features of automation at the orientation and the experience of agency within 
performance episode surveys, I ultimately combined the orientation and performance 
episode reports of the experiential features of automation and all of these measures were 
self-report in nature. 
In addition to the problem of common method variance, self-report data is also 
prone to biased response styles, including consistency and social desirability (Podsakoff & 
Organ, 1986). Consistency, or the consistency motif, refers to the tendency of participants 
to provide what they believe is a consistent pattern of responses, perhaps to reduce 
cognitive dissonance that could occur from seemingly conflicting answers. For example, 
the consistency motif would suggest that participants have a desire to answer positively 
about their levels of work engagement if they had previously responded in a positive 
manner regarding their experiences of control and vice versa. Additionally, social 




‘desirable’ to the researcher. For example, a participant may be more likely to report high 
experiences of agency and work engagement because of the societal value placed on those 
feeling states, rather than their actual feelings. Much of the data in this study did exhibit a 
slight negative skew, which provides some indication that social desirability bias may have  
occurred. 
Although these issues are well-known problems with self-report research, it is also 
true that the constructs of interest in this study were inherently dependent on individuals’ 
perceptions and experiences. How can we understand how people feel about technology 
without asking them? However, this type of self-report research could be supplemented 
with additional methods in future studies to gain a better understanding of exactly how 
much of the variance in the relationships described in this paper could be attributed to 
common method variance, consistency, and social desirability effects. For example, future 
research could include an implicit measure of agency, intentional binding, by asking 
participants to report temporal duration judgments of recent performance episodes and 
comparing those judgments to the timestamps of the surveys to assess whether intentional 
binding (i.e., the feeling of agency) is occurring or not. Although implicit and explicit 
measures of agency are not exactly the same (Dewey & Knoblich, 2014; Saito, Takahata, 
Murai, & Takahashi, 2015), this approach could provide some additional buffering against 
common method variance. Moreover, participants would likely not be motivated to respond 
in a socially desirable manner in providing these duration judgments. Similarly, it may be 
helpful to include some additional instruction to participants in future research efforts 




of agency right now does not mean you are not an ‘agentic person’”), and emphasizing the 
importance of providing honest, reflective feedback of one’s momentary experiences.   
Fourth, in addition to the potential of socially desirable response sets, there are a 
few additional concerns regarding the negative skew of many of the scales included in the 
performance episode surveys. In one scenario, participant responses may have reflected 
their true experiences and were not reflective of response bias(es), but this scenario further 
entails either a lack of representativeness in the study sample (e.g., the participants were 
unusually happy with the automated technologies in their work) or a lack of negative 
experiences with automated technologies. The latter scenario would suggest that future 
research on this topic would be unnecessary because people generally feel agentic while 
using automated business software because the experiential features, like perceived ease of 
use and reliability, are all satisfactory. While it is more likely that the study sample is non-
representative (despite a wide variety of jobs and types of software in the study sample), 
another possibility is that the data reflect response bias(es) to the performance episode 
surveys, such as social desirability or acquiescence bias, wherein survey respondents tend 
to agree with all the survey statements. There were no reverse-coded items or bogus 
questions within the performance episode surveys, which could have helped to prevent (or 
at least detect) acquiescent responding. Future studies may benefit from larger sample sizes 
to help ensure a more diverse study population, as well as the inclusion of negatively-
worded items.  
Fifth, the strict focus on between-person, rather than within-person trends was a 
limitation of the current study. Due to the novelty of the current research questions, I was 




business software in the study. As such, I restricted each participant to responding about a 
single automated business software in the orientation and performance episode surveys, 
even though many participants indicated that they used several different types of automated 
business software in their jobs. The restriction to between-person analyses permitted a 
shorter study duration which fit within the cost constraints of the study, although it 
precluded the collection of potentially meaningful information regarding within-person 
trends between experiences of automation and experiences of agency. A future 
examination of workers who use several diverse types of automated business software in 
their jobs would help to shed light on potential differences or similarities between within- 
and between-person relationships of these variables.  
 Future Directions 
The current study has provided several avenues for future research by introducing 
the novel topics of automated technology and the experience of agency to the 
organizational literature. First, given the preliminary evidence regarding the between-
person relationships between the experiential features of automation and agency provided 
by the current study, future research should examine the within-person relationships 
between the experiential features of automation and agency. A true ESM examination of 
this relationship could serve many purposes. ESM research could better illuminate the 
extent to which individuals’ experiences of the software in their jobs vary across time and 
across types of software, which would provide more stable estimates of the relationships 
reported here. Additionally, ESM research could capture individuals’ performance 
episodes that include and omit automated business software across the workday and 




meaningful changes in workers’ experiences of agency compared to work activities that do 
not involve automation. Finally, future research in this vein could easily capture additional 
work-relevant outcomes that were not included in the current research, including objective 
performance outcomes like productivity, efficiency, and accuracy in tasks coupled with 
automated technologies.   
Beyond the above research questions that stem naturally out of the current findings, 
I have two propositions for future research in this area that are quite different from this 
study and from each other. First, despite the current study’s focus on generalizability within 
a naturalistic setting, experimental research in this area would be quite informative. The 
current study made several extrapolations from the extant laboratory research that has been 
conducted on the effects of automation on the sense of agency, yet a closer approximation 
to the traditional research methods could yield more precise information regarding the 
unique impacts of each of the experiential features of automation on the experience of 
agency. A full factorial design could examine the unique and joint effects of some or all of 
the experiential features of automation, as well as potential moderating factors of the 
relationships. For example, an experimental study could examine whether the interaction 
effect between task difficulty and level of automation on the experience of agency 
replicates in a laboratory setting and whether the effect is driven more by the perceived or 
actual level of automation.  
Another completely different future direction would be an examination of how 
work with automated technologies impacts individuals’ choice and quality of leisure time. 
Automation is changing the nature of work, which has clear implications for the types of 




to know how individuals who are greatly impacted by these changes will respond in terms 
of the ways in which they spend their time outside of work.  Decades ago, Kabanoff (1980) 
presented a review of the literature on work/leisure relations, which included the notions 
of ‘generalization’ and ‘compensation’ uses of leisure for individuals who lack control in 
their work. The generalization theory suggests that individuals who are alienated by their 
work (i.e., individuals who experience low control in their work) will also exhibit passive 
behavior in their leisure time, which could be characterized by passive political and social 
involvement. Alternatively, the compensation theory suggests that individuals who are 
alienated from their work may attempt to make up for that lack of control by pursuing 
leisure activities that are personally meaningful and enriching. These theories could be 
easily applied to the modern context of workers who experience diminished agency in their 
jobs due to increased automation (e.g., cashier workers who are now ‘checkout assistance 
helpers’). Future research could examine the conditions under which either or both of these 
theories help to explain how modern workers cope with the changing nature of work due 
to automation.  
 Conclusion 
This study represented an important first step in the understanding of automated 
technologies in the workplace, particularly as it pertains to workers’ experiences of agency. 
The findings suggest that there are several experiential features of automation that can 
impact agency, both positively and negatively. Additionally, agency was positively related 
to feelings of authenticity and work engagement, which suggests that agency is an 




within the organizational sciences. Future research is needed to more fully explicate the 





APPENDIX A. PILOT STUDY  
A.1 Pilot Study Description 
A pilot study was conducted to answer two primary research questions. The first 
research question was whether the full study can limit eligible automated business software 
to a single function, for example, only automated business software that supports decision-
making. The second research question was whether individuals’ report differing 
experiences of the features of automation with the automated software in their jobs across 
different work tasks. The pilot study was conducted using a Qualtrics survey and 
participants will be recruited through word-of-mouth and online ads. Recruitment for the 
pilot study was restricted to participants who use an automated business software in their 
jobs. Pilot study participants were also required to live and work in the United States, be at 
least 18 years old, and work full-time. Participants were paid $5 for the completion of the 
survey. 
In the pilot study survey, participants were asked to provide the name and a short 
qualitative description of the automated software they use in their jobs. Participants were 
asked to provide the names of the top three tasks (or fewer, if necessary) that accompany 
their software use. Participants completed a checklist to identify the function(s) that the 
software provides for each task: (a) information acquisition, (b) information analysis, (c) 
decision selection, and/or (d) action implementation, (e) other (write-in option). This 
component of the pilot study provided insight into whether the full study could limit the 
inclusion of automated business software to a specific function (e.g., those that aid 




functions other than decision-making or most reported tasks involved multiple functions, 
it would not be possible to limit the eligible automated business software to a single 
function for the full study. 
In addition to providing task descriptions, participants were also asked to rate the 
experiential features of automation (perceived level of automation, perceived ease of use, 
perceived usefulness, perceived reliability, and experience/skill) of the automated business 
software and associated experiences of agency for each reported task. This component of 
the pilot study provided insight into the general relationships between the features of 
automation and agency, as well as if there were differences in these relationships between 
different types of automation functions and/or tasks. If there are practical within-person 
differences in the relationships between the experiential features of automation and agency 
between the reported tasks, the experiential features of automation items would be included 
in the Performance Episode surveys to capture potential within-person trends in the full 
study.   
Results 
40 full-time workers participated in the pilot study. There were a wide range of 
reported software types, including Salesforce, Quickbooks, Schoolzilla, and Concerto. A 
full list of all of the reported automated business software brands, as well as the broader 
categories that they fall into, can be found in Appendix A.1. Of the total 40 participants 
who participated in the pilot study survey, there were 31 participants who completed all 




To address the first pilot study research question about whether the automated 
business software could be limited to a single function for the full study, I examined the 
functions of the reported automated business software at software- and task-levels. At the 
software-level, there was an average of 3.19 functions (SD = 1.08), and at the task level 
there was an average of 2.08 functions (SD = 0.98). These results suggest that rather than 
using automated business software for a single function, participants reported using 
automated business software for multiple functions, even at the task level. Additionally, 
the four automation functions that were provided to participants were endorsed at similar 
levels. Across all software types and tasks, the function ‘information acquisition’ was 
endorsed 57 times, information analysis was endorsed 51 times, action implementation was 
endorsed 39 times, and decision selection was endorsed 31 times. Thus, it was decided for 
the full study that eligible automated business software would not be restricted by 
automation function and all types of automated business software would be included. 
The second major research question of the pilot study was whether participants’ 
reports of the features of automation may differ across tasks, which would necessitate 
additional measurement of those items within the performance episode surveys in the full 
study, rather than just within the orientation survey. This question was addressed by 
examining the ICCs of the features of automation within person, such that an ICC of 1 
would indicate perfect within-person agreement on a given feature between the three 
reported tasks, on average, across all participants. The descriptive statistics and computed 
ICCs for each of the features of automation, as well as the reported experiences of agency, 
can be found in this appendix. The ICCs for the features of automation ranged from .38 - 




level for many of the features. Given the wide range in variability of the features of 
automation across tasks, the full study will incorporate the features of automation items at 
the performance episode level to account for any task-based differences in individuals’ 
experiences of automation that may account for their experiences of agency in those tasks, 
above and beyond their average experiences of the automated software in their jobs. 
Another secondary research question of the pilot study was whether individuals’ 
experience with automated business software would be better operationalized as the 
amount of time spent working with the software or as the level of familiarity with the 
software. The measure of individuals’ experience with the automated business software by 
time had an ICC of .97, whereas the measure of individuals’ experience by familiarity had 
an ICC of .48. Given that the other features of automation had ICCs that ranged between 
.38 - .70, the measure of experience by familiarity displayed much more similar within- 
versus between-person variance than did the measure of experience by time. Moreover, the 
measure of experience by familiarity displayed more consistent relationships (in the 
expected direction) with the other variables of interest than did the measure of experience 
by time. Thus, the full study will utilize the measure of experience by familiarity rather 







A.2 Pilot Study Automated Business Software and Software Categories 
Software Name N  Software Categories N 
Adobe Photoshop CC 2018 1  Accounting 1 
Atlassian Bamboo/Bitbucket 2  Business Process Management 1 
Bloomberg 1  Continuous Integration 2 
Concerto 1  Customer Relationship Management 7 
Design Manager 1  Data Analysis 3 
Ellucian 1  Data Visualization 1 
Etelmar 1  Educational Data Management 1 
Greenhouse 1  Enterprise Resource Planning 1 
iCIMS 1  Financial Services 1 
Milliman PRM Analytics 1  Healthcare Risk Management 1 
MRI  1  Interior Design  1 
NVivo 1  IT Operations Management 1 
Pega 1  Media Planning 1 
Quickbooks 1  Photo Editing 1 
R 1  Point of Sale 1 
Rundeck 1  Portfolio Management 1 
Salesforce 5  Quality Management System 1 
SAP 1  Real Estate 2 
Schoolzilla 1  Talent Acquisition 2 
SkySlope 1  Team Email Client 1 
Solve 1    
Spark 1    
SPSS 1    
Square 1    
Tableau 1    








A.3 Descriptive statistics and Correlations of Pilot Study Variables 
Variable M SD ICC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
            
1. Perceived Level 
of Automation 
4.48 2.54 .70                 
                     
2. Perceived Ease of 
Use 
5.54 1.18 .50 .15               
                     
3. Perceived 
Usefulness 
6.24 0.73 .43 .08 .76**             
                     
4. Perceived 
Reliability 
6.05 1.05 .52 -.10 .50** .47**           
                     
5. Experience 
(Familiarity) 
4.02 0.75 .48 -.18 .49** .55** .28         
                     
6. Experience 
(Time) 
3.65 3.34 .97 -.02 -.30 -.44* -.10 -.14       
                     
7. Skill 3.76 0.72 .38 -.27 .50** .52** .11 .90** -.10     
                     
8. Intention- 
Outcome Match 
4.38 0.60 .45 .00 .77** .77** .58** .55** -.37* .54**   
                     
9. Experienced 
Control 
4.18 0.86 .70 -.23 .42* .49** .23 .35 -.34 .47** .58** 




APPENDIX B.  AUTOMATED BUSINESS SOFTWARE 
B.1 Automated Business Software Eligible for Full Study 
• 3DS Max 
• 99 Dollar Social  
• Adobe InDesign 
• Apptivo  
• Arena Simulation  
• Asana  
• Asset Panda 
• athenahealth 









• Brightbook  
• Brilliant 







• Culture Amp 
• Design Manager 
• EBSuite  
• ECOUNT ERP 
• Ellucian CRM 
• ePROMIS ERP 
• ERPNext 
• EZOfficeInventory 
• Fastflow  
• Fieldbook  
• FivePoint  




• GravityFlow  
• Greenhouse 
Software 
• Hippo CMMS 
• Hootsuite  
• HubSpot 
• iCIMs 
• iLab Core 
• Infusionsoft 
• Integrify  
• Intercom  
• Kareo Billing 
• Kissflow  





• Midas Health 
Analytics 
• MIE Trak Pro 
• Milliman PRM 







• Nutcache  
• NVivo 





• Process Director  
• ProcessMaker  
• Python 



















• Simio simulation  
• Sisense  
• SketchUp 
• Skyslope 












• TrackVia  
• Trackwise 
• Trello  
• Vend 
• Vocus 
• WorkDay  
• Wunderlist  
• Xero 
• Zapier  
• Zendesk 
• Zenefits 
• Zoho Books 










B.2 List of Software Categories Eligible for Full Study 
• Accounting Software 
• Architecture Software 
• Asset Management Software 
• Customer Relationship Management (CRM) Software 
• Customer Support Software 
• Data Analysis Software 
• Design Engineering Software 
• EHR Software 
• Enterprise Resource Planning Software 
• Facility Management Software 
• Human Resource (HR) Management Software 
• Marketing & Social Media Software 
• Medical Software 
• Point of Sale Software 
• Real Estate Software 





B.3 Automated Business Software Used in Full Study  
Software Name  Count Software Name  Count 
Adobe After Effects 1 MAP 1 
AllPay 1 Margo 4 
Biomedical Help Desk  1 Microsoft Dynamics 365 1 
Blackboard 1 Mindbody 1 
Bloomberg 1 Mitchell and McCormick  2 
Bluestar 1 Monday 1 
Brokermetrics 1 Moodle 1 
BST 2 Nextech 1 
Business Intelligence 1 Notepad ++ 1 
Campus Lab Org Sync platform 1 PeopleSoft 2 
Camtasia 1 Practice CS 1 
Cerner 1 Procore 1 
CHCS 1 QuickBooks 2 
Clockwork 1 Raiser's Edge 1 
Commissioning Test  1 REDCap  1 
CommShop360 1 RF Scanner 1 
CorpTax 1 RStudio 1 
CoSchedule 2 Salesforce 10 
DegreeWorks 1 
SEI Trust and Bank 
Compliance Software 1 
Enterprise RX 1 ServiceNow 1 
EPIC 2 Shiftboard 1 
E-Recruit 1 Smartsheet 1 
FivePoints 1 Sprout Social 1 
HPe Unified Functional Testing  1 SQL Developer  1 
HubSpot  1 Starrez 1 
IBM 1 Teamwork 1 
iCIMS 1 Tri-Tech CAD  1 
InfusionSoft 1 Ultipro 1 
JIRA 1 Workday 1 
Kaseya 1 Workfront 1 






B.4 List of Software Categories in Full Study 
 
  
Broad Software Category Count 
CRM 16 
Data Management 15 
Education  4 
Finance Management 8 
Healthcare Information 8 
Human Capital Management 6 
IT Management 4 
Marketing Management 7 
Project Management  8 
Real Estate (Data Management)  1 




APPENDIX C. PARTICIPANT PHONE SCREENING SCRIPT 
Hello, 
My name is [] and I am a researcher in the Work Experience Lab at Georgia Tech, 
is this still a good time to talk? Thank you for expressing interest in participating in 
our research study. Just so you know, I will be reading from a script so that I don’t 
miss anything. The purpose of our research study is to understand the role of 
technology in people’s work lives. Participation in this study involves completing an 
online orientation and three days of short, mobile-based surveys. The maximum 
compensation for this study is $35.  
Do you have any questions or concerns? 
Wait for response. 
Okay, great. Before you can enroll in the study, I need to ask you some questions to 
ensure that you are eligible to participate. The questions should take more than 10 
minutes of your time to answer.  
Wait for response. 
Okay, great. As a reminder, I will be reading the questions from a script so that I 
don’t miss any important information, but please feel free to ask me to slow down or 
to repeat or rephrase a question whenever necessary. 
Do you currently live and work in the United States? 
If yes, continue. 
If no: 
“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
live and work in the United States for this study. If you would like, we can keep your 
contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for future studies that 
you might be eligible for……Thank you, good bye.” 
How many hours a week do you currently work? 
If 30 or more hours per week, continue. 
If less than 30 hours per week: 
“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
work at least 30 hours per week for this study. If you would like, we can keep your 
contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for future studies that 
you might be eligible for……Thank you, good bye.” 
Do you own a smartphone device? 





“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
own smartphone devices because we use a smartphone application to administer the daily 
surveys in this study. If you would like, we can keep your contact information in our 
participant database and reach out to you for future studies that you might be eligible 
for……Thank you, good bye.” 
Now I am going to read a short description of the kinds of automated technologies 
that we are interested in for this study, and I will ask you a question at the end. 
As I have mentioned, in this study we are interested in examining the role of 
technology in people’s work lives. For this purpose, we are only including 
participants who use some kind of automated software in their work roles. By 
‘automated software’, I mean any kind of automated software solution that you use 
in your work role that helps you accomplish one or more tasks in your job. The 
term ‘automation’ is broad, and it does not necessarily mean that the software ‘does 
everything for you’. Automation can exist on many levels, that range on how much 
or how little assistance the software provides. 
An example of a popular automated software is Customer Relationship 
Management software or ‘CRM’ software. This software is considered to be a form 
of ‘automation’ because it organizes information about a business’s customers and 
can provide users with next steps and data insights based on that information.  
Please feel free to ask questions you may have or please let me know if it would be 
helpful for me to repeat the description. If you think that you may use a software 
that qualifies, but aren’t sure, please let me know and we can discuss it. Based on 
this description, do you believe that you use an automated software in your job? 
If yes, continue. 
If not sure: 
“Okay, I will ask some you some questions about the technology that will help me 
determine whether or not it is an automated software that is eligible for this study” 
If no: 
“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
use automated software in their jobs for this study. If you would like, we can keep your 
contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for future studies that 
you might be eligible for……Thank you, good bye.” 
What is the name of the automated software that you use in your job? 
Record name. If not in pre-defined list, look up the software online while on the phone 
with participant, and tell participant to please hold while researching the software. If 
online descriptions of software fall into one of the major categories listed in Appendix B, 
add the name of the software to the list and continue. If the software is not listed in a 
predefined major category, record any description of the software found online and note 




Can you please provide a short description of the kinds of tasks that you use the 
software for? 
Record description. 
If the software was not already in the example list of automated business software and 
was not a part of any major category listed, please let the participant know that the 
eligibility screening will continue, but follow-up research on the specific software 
mentioned will need to be conducted to ensure final eligibility (and modify language 
when finishing the phone call if answers to all other questions indicate eligibility). If 
otherwise eligible by the end of all questions in the phone screen, tell participants that a 
final verdict regarding eligibility will be provided in 24-48 hours from the end of the 
phone conversation. 
 “Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
use automated software for decision-making tasks for this study. If you would like, we 
can keep your contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for 
future studies that you might be eligible for……Thank you, good bye.” 
  
How many days per week, on average, do you use this software in your job? 
If 3 days or more per week, continue. 
If less than 2-3 days per week, but still weekly: 
“Okay, thank you. Just so you know, the daily survey portion of this study involves 
responding to three short surveys across three days of work directly after working with 
the automated software in your job. Since you don’t use your software everyday, we just 
ask that you respond to the surveys when you can, even if it’s not three consecutive days 
in a row.” 
If not weekly: 
“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
use the software daily or almost daily in their jobs. If you would like, we can keep your 
contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for future studies that 
you might be eligible for……Thank you, good bye.” 
For my last question, I will give you a short description of the way we plan to 
measure your use of the software in your job and then ask if it applies to you. Pause.  
For this study, we are interested in examining people’s performance episodes with 
automated software. ‘Performance episodes’ refer to people’s use of automated 
software for specific tasks in their jobs. Performance episodes have noticeable start 
and end times and are organized around performance goals. For example, a 
salesperson may use a CRM software to track a client’s data from 9 am to 10 am on 
a given workday, and that would qualify as a performance episode. In a 
performance episode, a person may completely finish a task, but they don’t have to 




performance episodes in this study is that they are meaningful chunks of time where 
a person is working with the automated software towards a specific work goal.  
Based on this description, do you believe that your work with the automated 
software in your job could be described in ‘performance episodes’?  
(if people are confused or need more explanation) 
Another way to think about it is... different ways that you might use the software 
in your job and then ask which description fits you better. For this study, we think 
about software use in two ways: task-based or continual. By task-based, we mean 
that you use the technology for specific tasks that have a noticeable start and end 
time and your work episodes with the technology are organized around 
performance goals. 
Task-based use of technology means that you probably use the technology for 
some of your work tasks and responsibilities, but not all of them. On the other 
hand, continual use of technology would mean that you use the technology 
throughout the workday for all of your work tasks and responsibilities, and would 
not be able to report start and end times with your tasks with the technology 
because your use of the technology is constant. Based on these two descriptions, 
would you say that your use of the software in your job is task-based or 
continual? 
If Yes: 
“Okay, thank you. Based on your responses, it appears that you are eligible to participate 
in this study. The next step in participation is completing the online orientation, which I 
will email to you when we finish this call. The orientation includes an informed consent, 
which has a complete description of the study and payment information, and there are 
also some questionnaires and information about the daily survey portion of the study. The 
orientation will take at most 30 minutes to complete, and you can complete it on your 
own time. Once you have completed the orientation, you’ll be able to start the daily 
survey portion of the study.  Do you have any questions before we end the call? …. 
Thank you for your time, have a good day. Good bye.” 
If No: 
“Thank you for your answer, but unfortunately we are only including participants who 
use the software in performance episodes in their jobs. If you would like, we can keep 
your contact information in our participant database and reach out to you for future 





APPENDIX D. STUDY MEASURES 
D.1 Level of Automation Taxonomy 






D.2 Perceived Ease of Use and Usefulness Scales 
Perceived Ease of Use Scale (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000) 
1. My interaction with the [system] is clear and understandable. 
2. Interacting with the [system] does not require a lot of my mental effort. 
3. I find the [system] to be easy to use. 
4. I find it easy to get the system to do what I want it to do. 
 
Perceived Usefulness Scale (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000) 
1. Using the [system] improves my performance in my job. 
2. Using the [system] in my job increases my productivity. 
3. Using the [system] enhances my effectiveness in my job. 





D.2 Affinity for Technology Scale 
Affinity for Technology Scale (Edison & Geissler, 2003) 
1. Technology is my friend. 
2. I enjoy learning new computer programs and hearing about new technologies. 
3. People expect me to know about technology and I don’t want to let them down. 
4. If I am given an assignment that requires that I learn to use a new program or how 
to use a machine, I usually succeed. 
5. I relate well to technology and machines. 
6. I am comfortable learning new technology. 
7. I know how to deal with technological malfunctions or problems. 
8. Solving a technological problem seems like a fun challenge. 
9. I find most technology easy to learn. 





D.3 Technology Self-Efficacy Scale 
Technology Self-Efficacy Scale (Holden & Rada, 2011) 
Statement: In general, I could complete any desired task using any computer/Internet 
application if… 
 
1. …there was no one around to tell me what to do as I go.  
2. …I had never used a technology like it before. 
3. …I had only the manuals for reference. 
4. …I had seen someone else using it before trying it myself. 
5. …I could call someone for help if I get stuck. 
6. …someone else had helped me get me started. 
7. …I had a lot of time to complete the task for which the technology was provided. 
8. …I had just the built-in help facility for assistance. 
9. …someone showed me how to do it first. 





D.5 Affect Grid 
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